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IN GOD WE TRUST:
THE JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF
AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION
JAMES J. KNICELY AND JOHN W. WHITEHEAD*
There is therefore a purely civil profession of faith of which the
Sovereign should fix the articles, not exactly as religious dogmas,
but as social sentiments without which a man cannot be a good
citizen or a faithful subject.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In his recent moral history of the American Civil War, Harry
Stout, the Jonathan Edwards Professor of History at Yale
University, vividly describes the sacraments of de facto American
Civil Religion. 2 They include devotion to "sacred monuments" and
battlefields (temples shrouded with a sense of "reverential awe"),
sentimental allegiance to sacred texts, pledges and songs
identifying America with celestial themes, undivided loyalty to the
flag as "America's totem"-an icon worthy to kill for and to be
killed-with critics who burn it, "desecrators," trampling on the
divine. 3 Presidents and Generals are the de facto prophets and
priests of the sacred traditions of this civic faith, with West Point,
its preeminent seminary. Many of these rites, sacraments, icons,
and venerated places were born of the American Civil War-from
what Stout describes as the rebirth of the union from "a sort of
massive sacrifice on the national altar"-bonded by "a baptism of
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John W. Whitehead: Founder and President, The Rutherford Institute,
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of Arkansas Law School, 1974.
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Nathan Haley, and Christopher Moriarty for help and assistance with this
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1. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, BOOK IV.
2. HARRY S. STOUT, UPON THE ALTAR OF THE NATION: A MORAL HISTORY
OF THE CIVIL WAR (2006).

3. Id. at xviii-xix, 454.
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blood [that unveiled] transcendent dimensions of th[e] union."4 In
this milieu, serving country is equated to serving God, and dying
for country, dying for faith,5 a civil commitment "that deeply and
widely binds the citizens of the nation together with ideas they
possess and express about the sacred nature, the sacred ideals, the
sacred character, and sacred meanings of their country.".
Though less bellicose and jingoistic, and seemingly grounded
in a spirit of humility and gratitude aimed more at the
development of national character than national redemption,
George Washington also fostered a tradition of acknowledging
divine providence as a guiding force in the early years of the
Republic. His pronouncements of public religion have been said to
follow generally the Anglican Book of Common Prayer, frequently
attributing founding events to providential superintendence. 7 In
his Circular Letter to the States in 1783, for example, Washington
wrote to the Governors of the new states acknowledging both Old
and New Testament traditions:
I now make it my earnest prayer, that God would have you, and the
State over which you preside, in his holy protection .

.

. and finally,

he would most graciously be pleased to dispose us all, to do Justice,
to love mercy, and to demean ourselves with that Charity, humility
and pacific temper of mind, which were the Characteristics of the
Divine Author of our blessed Religion, and without an humble
imitation of whose example in these things, we can never hope to be
a happy Nation.8

No doubt, Washington's example of infusing both official
pronouncements and personal communications with an evident
sense of divine direction during the early period of the country's
founding made him "the architect of a visible and durable public
role for religion in American political culture."9 Whether this was
borne of political expediency in an emerging nation inheriting
numerous and diverse state religious establishments, or a sense of
genuine appreciation and necessity for the blessings of God in the
formation of the new union, or even a beneficent leader's
restrained emulation of the Royal tradition of divine right, will
never be fully known. The sentiments nevertheless frame repeated
actions of Washington in his tenure as the first President.
4. Id. at xxii. Stout points out the Civil War had "two civil religions ...
each identical in theological terminology and morally opposed." Id. at 468 n.20.
5. Id. at xviii.
6. Id.
7. JEFFRY H. MORRISON, PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY, PROVIDENCE, AND
THE REPUBLIC 156 (2009).
8. George Washington, Circular to the States (Oct. 18, 1780), in 20 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT

SOURCES, 1931-44 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931). The sentiments mirror
Biblical scriptures found in Micah 6:8 and Philippians2:8.
9. MORRISON, supra note 7, at 158.
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More contemporaneous manifestations of civil religion
blossomed during or immediately after major wars. The "Pledge of
Allegiance" was "codified" by Congress during World War II as
part of rules and customs governing display of the flag, with
"under God" added by Act of Congress twelve years later during
the Cold War.' 0 "In God We Trust" was placed on coinage during
the Civil War, and added to all currency in 1957 after its adoption
by Congress in 1956 as the National Motto." Ongoing expressions
of the civic faith recur, as with Washington, in sentiments
expressed by individual office holders during the course of public
duties in the executive and legislative branches, for example,
during State of the Union or Inaugural speeches, proclamations, or
in times of national crisis, emergency, or war. Recently, however,
individually expressed prayers and speeches or performances at
government functions or on government property that include
sectarian sentiments have been censored or challenged as
unlawful Establishments of religion on grounds that sectarian
views exceed the limits of permitted expression of governmentally
12
endorsed "civic faith" or are unduly proselytizing or disruptive.

10. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 7 (2004).

11. U. S. Treasury Fact Sheet: Currency and Coins, History of In God We
(last
Trust, http://ustreas.gov/about/education/Pages/in-god-we-trust.aspx
visited Jan. 2, 2011).
12. See, e.g., Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105360
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 28, 2010) (holding that first come, first serve legislative prayer
by clergy at County Commission meetings violated Establishment Clause
because majority of content reflected Christian prayer); McComb v. Crehan,
320 F. App'x 507 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that prevention of Valedictorian's
speech that allegedly proselytized in mentioning Jesus Christ and scripture
did not violate First Amendment or Free Exercise rights although CoValedictorian's speech about prayer, God, and faith in non-sectarian terms
was permitted); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding
censorship of instrumental graduation performance of "Ave Marie" in program
containing eight other instrumental music pieces did not violate Equal
Protection); Turner v. Mayor and City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352
(4th Cir. 2008) (O'Connor, J. sitting by designation) (affirming that City
Councilman's Free Exercise and First Amendment rights were not violated
when Councilman mentioned Jesus Christ in opening legislative prayer while
other Council members invoked Almighty Father, Gracious God and other
references to Deities under non-denominational prayer policy), cert denied, 129
S.Ct. 909 (2009); Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F.Supp.2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005)
(holding that legislative prayer must be non-sectarian), rev'd on other grounds
506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007); Klingenschmidt v. Winter, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
22630 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 21, 2007) (holding that Navy Chaplain's failure to follow
Navy regulation limiting sectarian prayer did not violate First Amendment
and was grounds for dismissal from service); Gathright v. Portland, 439 F.3d
573 (9th Cir. 2006) (enjoining city from attempting to eject street preacher
from government premises); Wynne v. Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir.
2004) (holding that City Council's proselytizing legislative prayer violated
Establishment Clause); Child Evangelism Fellowship, Inc. v. Montgomery
Cnty. Pub. Sch., 373 F.3d 589 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that governmental
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Over the last sixty years, the Supreme Court's nationalization
of the Establishment Clause (when it incorporated the Clause
against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson v.
Board of Education3 ) has elevated the Court to the role of final
mediator of matters of Church and State. When it abandoned 150
years of jurisprudence to assume responsibility for religious affairs
in Everson, the Court proceeded to de-establish state practices of
prescribed school prayer, Bible reading, and funding for religious
schools. 14 In more recent years, the Court and the lower Federal
judiciary (with few exceptions) have approved state censorship of
individually spoken sectarian speech at governmentally sponsored
events.15 The latter has been enjoined on grounds that government
denial of access to certain established communication forums by religious
group in public elementary schools was unconstitutional); O'Hair v. Andrus,
613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that Celebration of Mass on National
Mall by Pope John Paul II did not violate Establishment Clause).
13. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
14. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down state
law permitting reimbursement to secular schools for costs of faculty salaries
and course materials for secular instruction); Abington Twp. Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (declaring faculty-led reading of Bible in public
schools unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (declaring state
prescribed, faculty-led school prayer unconstitutional).
15, But see, e.g., Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 685 F. Supp. 2d 524 (D. Del.
2010) (holding that sectarian references in some School Board members'
prayers did not render Board prayer policy unconstitutional); Doe v.
Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 631 F. Supp. 2d 823 (E.D. La. 2009) (stating that
"this Court refuses to reduce Marsh to a sectarianlnon-sectarian litmus test");
Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that "[w]e read
Marsh .. . to forbid judicial scrutiny of prayers absent evidence that legislative
prayers have been exploited to advance or disparage religion."). For decisions
endorsing American Civil Religion, see, for example, Simpson v. Chesterfield
Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
426 (2005), where Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson opined:
But in their civic faith, Americans have reached more broadly. Our civic
faith seeks guidance that is not the property of any sect. To ban all
manifestations of this faith would needlessly transform and devitalize
the very nature of our culture. When we gather as Americans, we do not
abandon all expressions of religious faith. Instead, our expressions
evoke common and inclusive themes and forswear, as Chesterfield has
done, the forbidding character of sectarian invocations.
Id. at 287. Likewise, Justice O'Connor, sitting by designation in Turner,
offered the following in approving a "nondenominational" prayer policy
adopted by the City of Fredericksburg, Virginia:
The prayers in both cases [Marsh and Simpson] shared a common
characteristic: they recognized the rich religious heritage of our country
in a fashion that was designed to include members of the community,
rather than to proselytize. The Council's decision to provide only
nonsectarian legislative prayers places it squarely within the range of
conduct permitted by Marsh and Simpson. The restriction that prayers
be nonsectarian in nature is designed to make the prayers accessible to
people who come from a variety of backgrounds, not to exclude or
disparage a particular faith.
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is either endorsing the private religious expression or that the
private individual expression is government speech-speech that
is not protected under the First Amendment because the speaker
is seen to be imbued with governmental authority, transforming
the otherwise private views into a "government" message for
which there is no constitutional protection.1 6 And while sectarian
speech has been censored, the courts have often exempted from
censorship individual religious speech that is non-sectarian on
grounds that it recognizes, "the rich religious heritage of our
country in a fashion that [is] designed to include members of the
community, rather than to proselytize." 17 These judicial
declarations that expressions of "civic faith" are permitted to the
exclusion of individually expressed sectarian expression are
becoming increasingly enshrined in case law-an immovable
edifice establishing American Civil Religion, exempt from
challenge under the First Amendment, and some would argue, no
less a religious creed and establishment of religion than others
proscribed by the Establishment Clause.' 8 The problem today is
not official acknowledgement of the obvious cultural truth that

Turner, 534 F. 3d at 356.
16. See, e.g., Turner, 534 F.3d 352 (holding that legislative prayer was
"governmental speech" and city's nondenominational legislative prayer policy
did not violate Free Speech and Free Exercise rights); ACLU of New Jersey, v.
Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (En Banc)
(holding that school board's policy of nonsectarian invocation at graduation
ceremonies by local clergy on rotating basis violated Establishment Clause).
When challenged, rather than resist, many state and local governments bow to
the threat of liability for attorneys' fees by adopting restrictions or censoring
individually-expressed religious sentiments on public property or at publicly
sponsored events. And when restrictions on speech that are imposed by
government are then challenged, groups that once threatened lawsuits hookup
with government to defend them. For example, see Turner, where after the
American Civil Liberties Union threatened to sue the City Council for allowing
a Council member to close his prayer in the name of Jesus, and when the
Council member challenged its refusal to let him pray, advocacy groups
responsible for the ban joined the City in its defense. Turner, 534 F.3d at 354;
but see Peck v. Upshur Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 1998) (where
school board successfully withstood ACLU challenge of policy of allowing
students to receive Bibles, except as to elementary schools).
17. Turner, 534 F.3d at 356.
18. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992) (recognizing that "a
civic religion" "has emerged in this country ... which is tolerated when
sectarian exercises are not"); Robert Luther III & David B. Caddell, Breaking
Away from the "PrayerPolice": Why the First Amendment Permits Sectarian
Legislative Prayer and Demands a "Practice-Focused"Analysis, 48 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 569, 587 (2008) (stating that although the Supreme Court in
Lee has said "that the government may not comprise an official prayer, it
follows that individually promulgated and expressed invocations containing
some sectarian references, including a deity, does not 'proselytize' or
'disparage,' in violation of Marsh, but is simply a tolerable accommodation of
the religious diversity in this country.").
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"[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being" (as documented by Justice Douglas sixty years
ago in Zorach v. Clauson'9), or as he indicated, of the "[p]rayers in
our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages
of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving
Day a holiday; 'so help me God' in our courtroom oaths," 20 etc., but
the exclusion and censorship of individual sectarian religious
expression at public events, while permitting individuals who
endorse American Civil Religion to have their say without
interference.
The exclusion of individually expressed sectarian speech from
publicly sponsored events has been accomplished in deference to
the relatively new, and potentially broad and wide-ranging,
principle of government speech, that is, read broadly, speech that
occurs in government sponsored programs or on government
controlled property (the principal basis for the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Pleasant Grove City v. SuMMuM21 where
privately-sponsored monuments on government property were
perceived to be government speech).22 The federal circuit court
rulings on this subject have raised a high bar to any sectarian
expression at governmental events, a nearly irrebuttable
presumption that the individual religious speech, even though
created and spoken by an individual, is not private, but instead,
government speech.23 Conversely, non-sectarian religious speech
that is perceived as expressing the common civic faith is
permitted. 24 This "discerning" approach, based largely on judicial
perception, threatens not only to extinguish the virtues of
accommodation and diversity of religious expression in the public
sphere (values that Washington himself promoted and worked
hard to nourish),25 but amplifies the avenues for majoritarian
intolerance about which James Madison warned in the Federalist
Papers. 26 In the extreme, as in the American Civil War, it provides
a store of dry tinder for the fires of Nationalism when a leader, or
a tyrannically fervent majority, co-opt and manipulate the
approved civic faith to suppress sectarian dissent in the
advancement of xenophobic or other political ends.27
19. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

20. Id. at 312-13.
21. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.Ct. 1125 (2009).

22. Id. at 1127.
23. See Turner, 534 F.3d at 353 (stating that "[bjecause the prayers at issue
here are government speech, we hold that Fredericksburg's prayer policy does
not violate Turner's Free Speech and Free Exercise rights.").
24. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 287.
25. MORRISON, supra note 7.
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
27. In the Civil War, both sides prayed to the same God and sought His
intervention. In recent times, religious views on foreign wars have been highly
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After briefly defining civil religion in the light of history, this
Article reviews de facto American Civil Religion, its entrenchment
in the nation's psyche, its potential social benefits, and the
dangers it poses for individual freedom and American society. The
Article then turns to the Supreme Court's decision in Summum
where the Court categorically declared privately-sponsored
monuments on government property to be government speech, 28
and to other recent cases involving speech on government property
or at publicly sponsored events, including legislative prayer. The
Article concludes by suggesting that greater scrutiny is needed for
application of the government speech doctrine in order to avoid the
diminution of precious First Amendment liberties while at the
same time arguing that the judiciary should permit individually
expressed sectarian sentiments at public events in the interests of
accommodation, tolerance and religious diversity, and as a means
of avoiding the establishment of a monopolistic American Civil
Religion.
II.

HISTORICAL EXPRESSIONS OF CIVIL RELIGION

The roots of civil religion have been described as something
"eminently social," rather than individual or private.2 9 Ancient in
conception-with Plato's insistence that a civic religion could unite
a people30 and the prevalence of city religions throughout ancient
religion is a set of shared
Greece and Rome 31-civil
understandings within a society that have a transcendent life of
their own and are not dependent on the beliefs of any one
individual. 32 Taken to the extreme, civil religion may descend, as
Robert Bellah has written, toward "idolatrous worship of the
state." 33
diverse. Although many national religious leaders supported the war in
Vietnam, opposition to that war grew in good measure from the sustained,
active opposition of religious figures such as the Rev. William Sloan Coffin,
Rev. Daniel Berrigan, and Martin Luther King, Jr.
28. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1127 (stating that "[j]ust as governmentmonuments speak for the
commissioned and government-financed
government, so do privately financed and donated monuments that the
government accepts and displays to the public on government land.").
29. See Michael Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and
the Public Church, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 293, 318 (1993) (describing ideas of
nineteenth-century sociologist Emile Durkheim) See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE
ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE (Joseph W. Swain trans. 1915).
30. JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN GOSPEL: GOD, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND
THE MAKING OF A NATION 24 (2007).

31. WILL HERBERG, America's Civil Religion: What It Is and Whence It
Comes, in AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 76 (Russell E. Richey & Donald G. Jones
eds., 1974).
32. Id.
33. ROBERT N. BELLAH, Civil Religion in America, in AMERICAN CIVIL
RELIGION, supra note 31, at 22.
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In a 1970 article, John Coleman, of the University of
California, Berkeley, suggested a useful typology of civil religion.
He wrote that
there are three forms under which civil religion exists: continued
undifferentiation with either the church or the state acting as
sponsoring agent of the civil religion; a monopoly status for civil
religion under the form of secular nationalism; [and] differentiated
civil religion. 34
of civil religion and its
Historical
manifestations
manipulation for political purposes appear in early civilizations
based on the divine right of rulers, 35 as well as in the Roman
Republic-in the progression from the rule of the Gods, to Deified
Emperors, and finally to state-sponsored Roman Christianity.N It
37
also appears in varying degrees in Japanese Shinto Imperialism,
38
in the Jacobin hijacking of the French Revolution, and in the
secular religions of Soviet and Chinese communism,39 all of which
provide comparisons for American Civil Religion.
The concept of rule by divine right of kings traces back to
between 3,000 and 2,500 B.C. The tales and hieroglyphics of
Gilgamesh, from the city state of Uruk located within the current
day borders of Iraq, serve as the earliest documentation of rule by
divine right of kings. 40 Zoroastrianism, which first appeared in the
5th Century B.C. and came to be the dominant religion in Iran and
the Middle East, viewed the king as having a direct connection to
God. The texts of Zoroastrianism were considered the words of God
(and the king, the next God).41 After marginalizing Zoastrianism
in the 7th Century, rulers adhering to Islamic principles advanced
Allah as the only sovereign with the authority to make law.42
34. John A. Coleman, Civil Religion, 31 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, 67, 69

(Summer 1970).
35. Id. at 71.
36. Id.
37. Id.

38. Id. at 73.
39. Id.

40. According to legend, Gilgamesh was a half god because, while his father
was only a high priest, his mother was believed to be a goddess and his
grandfather, on his mother's side, to be a god. W.T.S. Thackara, The Epic of
Gilgamesh: A SpiritualBiography 1 (1999), available at http://www.theosophy

nw.org/world/mideast/mi-stst.htm.
41. Jalil Mahmoudi, Social Thought in Ancient Iran, in PERSIAN STUDIES IN
NORTH AMERICA: STUDIES IN HONOR OF MOHAMMAD ALI JAZAYERY 398

(Mehdi Marashi ed. 1994). An early leader, working under this general

proclamation, has been quoted as saying, "[rieligion and kingship are two
brothers, and neither can disperse with the other. Religion is the foundation of
kingship, and kingship protects religion." Id. Legend from Iran confirms the
tradition of kings being seen as holding super human divine powers justifying
their ability to rule by divine right. Id.
42. KHALED ABOu EL FADL, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY:
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Under true Islam, rulers did not have the authority to make their
own laws independent of the will of God, making it impossible to
have full separation of religion from government. This posed a
problem for the legitimacy of sovereign monarchs and democratic
governments alike. 43
The early Roman Republic used religion initially as a state
cult based on Roman Gods.44 Cicero "favored maintaining the
ancient system of divination in the interests of public welfare"
because it provided a means to show that "the will of the gods
accorded with the policies of state adopted by senate and
magistrates."45 Rome later gravitated to an emperor cult when
CAN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY TAKE ROOT IN FAITH? 12 (2003).

43. Nations such as Turkey, which had a long history of being ruled by
traditional Islamic divine right principles, serve as the best models of secular
governments in today's Middle Eastern Islamic world. LLOYD GEERING,
FUNDAMENTALISM: THE CHALLENGE TO THE SECULAR WORLD 9 (2003). In
present-day Turkey, rather than religion controlling government, government
now controls religion. Id. While citizens of Turkey are free to worship a
religion of their choice and participate in religious ceremonies, the state's role
in religion is prevalent. Id. Part 2, Chapter 2, Article 24 of the Turkish
Constitution states, "[e]ducation and instruction in religion and ethics shall be
conducted under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture
and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and
secondary schools." Const. of the Repub. Of Turk. Part 2 Chap. 2. This history
of Turkish secularism can almost certainly be attributed to the long tradition
of divine right of kings that existed in the lands of present-day Turkey.
GEERING, supra,at 9.
available at
of
God IV.27,
City
The
in
44. Augustine
http://www.amazon.com/City-God-Modern-Library-Classics/dp/0679783199,
writes of Quintus Mucius Scaevola-a magistrate, pontifex maximus, and legal
scholar of the 1st Century B.C.-who explained three types of gods handed
down to the Roman people in the years of the Roman Republic: one from the
poets, a second from the philosophers, and a third from politicians. Of these,
the one from poets was said to be for fools (nugatorium); the second from
philosophers is portrayed at odds with the requirements of civil life (non
congruere civitatibus); however, the third from politicians was thought by
Scaevola to be more useful for purposes of deceiving cities in matters of
religion (expedire igitur existimat falli in religione civitates). See ERNEST L.
FORTIN, Augustine and Roman Civil Religion: Some Critical Reflections in
CLASSICAL CHRISTIANITY AND THE POLITICAL ORDER: REFLECTIONS ON THE
THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL PROBLEM 85, 86 (J. Brian Benestad, ed., 1996)
(explaining how the Roman government used religion to control its populace).
Whether or not Augustine's account is historically accurate, the sentiment of
the management of religion for civil purposes was clearly shared by other
powerful Romans of the era.
45. LILY ROSS TAYLOR, PARTY POLITICS IN THE AGE OF CAESAR 77 (1984).
Ms. Taylor writes that Cicero, a member of the college of augurs, whose
members were charged with interpreting signs or warnings from the gods, did
not believe there was any way of ascertaining the will of the gods. Though a
skeptic, "he dwelt frequently in his speeches to the people on the ceremonies
and ritual of the state cult and sought to show that the will of the gods
accorded with the policies of state adopted by senate and magistrates." Id. In

878

The John MarshallLaw Review

[43:869

Julius Caesar was deified by order of the Roman Senate in 42
B.C., two years after his assassination, establishing a temple, a
special priest, and festivals in his honor. 46 Beginning with
Augustus, subsequent emperors were worshipped as gods,
commonly but in varying degrees, with statues and temples. 47 A
third progression began with imperial persecution of Christians
until they became so strong in numbers that the civil religion of
the empire was revoked, and with Constantine's conversion,
"Christianity took over the state cult as its own rightful
province." 48 Then, as one scholar writes, "the empire became
Christian; Christianity became imperial." 49 Rule by divine right
expanded in Europe and was frequently supported by biblical
addition to the political establishment's use of augury, the city magistrates
"entertained the gods, and incidentally the people, with elaborate dramatic
and circus games" and "feasted the gods, and often the people too, at banquets
and sacrifices." Id. Priests and magistrates were drawn from the same
political classes, and many individuals were simultaneously priests and
magistrates; both were essentially political posts. Id.
46. As Lily Ross Taylor explains,
The state religion, once an instrument used by the senatorial oligarchs
to impose their supremacy on the people, had later, and particularly in
the era of revolution, served rival groups in party politics. Now, in the
control of a supreme ruler, it functioned to support a monarch numbered
among the gods of the state.
Id. at 97.
47. The emperor cult came to be important as civil religion to the wider
empire. "When the emperor was worshipped as a manifest god and savior by
all his subjects, the society of the empire became a quasi-religious society,
centered by a common allegiance which was also a common cult." Coleman,
supra note 34, at 70 (quoting Sir ERNEST BARKER, CHURCH, STATE, AND
STUDY 132 (1930)). Inevitably, this requirement met opposition from
monotheistic imperial subjects. Early on, Jews were granted an exemption
from the requirement. Christians were not similarly exempt. Instead, the
emperors, "rightly sensing that Christianity undermined traditional Roman
civic and national religion, persecuted Christianity." Id. at 71.
48. Still, religious pluralism was not only tolerated in the imperial era,
"syncretistic amalgamation" of Roman and indigenous pantheons was accepted
and even encouraged. "Any god could rightly claim to his place in the
pantheon, so long as his worship was not exclusive. The controlling civic
demand was that subject nations also accept the worship of the emperor as a
symbol of Roman world-unity." Id. at 71.
49. Id. at 71 (quoting BARKER, supra note 47, at 134). When Constantine's
son Constantius assumed an active role in the church in the mid-Fourth
Century, taking "the first step toward the stage when the two institutions
would be commingled, and where Hellenistic concepts concerning divine
kingship would become Caesaropapism," the church fathers protested the
abuse of the church's liberty; Hilary of Poitiers, later Saint Hilary, "went so far
as to denounce Constantius for enslaving the church, and to yearn for the time
of the ancient persecutors, Nero and Decius, when torture and death led to
freedom." KARL FREDERICK MORRISON, Rome and the City of God: An Essay on
the ConstitutionalRelationships of Empire and Church in the Fourth Century,
in TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY, NEW SERIES 1,
7 (1964).
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passages from both the Old and New Testamento suggesting that
the rule of kings should be followed because they are the selected
rulers of God.51
Japanese Shintoism, which was made the state religion of
Japan in 1868, is an example of undifferentiated civil religion
sponsored by the state. Its most basic tenet, as in Roman emperor
cult, was the divine origin of the imperial dynasty. 52 Japan
promised freedom of religion, but defended the universal
requirement of Shinto observance by arguing it was not a religion
at all. 53 During World War II, Japanese authorities "virtually
50. One such quote comes from St Paul's epistle to the Romans: "[]et every
soul be subject unto the higher powers, for there is no power but of God, and
the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resists the
power, resists the ordinance of God. And they that resist shall receive to
themselves damnation." Romans 13:1-2 (King James). Quotes from St. Peter's
first epistle are equally compelling in favor of divine rule by kings, which
should be unchecked by citizens;
submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake,
whether it be to the king, as supreme.. .. For so is the will of God, that
with welldoing you may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men: as
free .

. .

. Honour all men. Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honour the

king. Servants be subject to your masters with fear, not only the good
and gentle, but also to the froward.
1 Peter 2:13, 15, 17-18 (King James).
51. DAVID WOOTTON, DIVINE RIGHT AND DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY OF
POLITICAL WRITING IN STUART ENGLAND 91-97 (1986). Prior to the
Enlightenment period, the king was believed to have been chosen by God to
express God's wishes, and it was deemed to be sin to disobey the king. The
modern day prevailing concept under which sovereign rule is the product of a
contract between man and government, has surety from the special
relationship between the king and God, a supreme contract that should not be
disturbed by average people. JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, THE THEORY OF THE
DIVINE RIGHTS OF KINGS 5-7 (1896).

52. The Japanese slogan "the whole world under one roof' symbolized a
perceived "special divine commission to expand sovereignty and righteousness
over ever widening territories" rooted in Shinto belief that Japanese people
enjoyed a "peerless national life" that they must share with all humanity and
thereby "contribute to the salvation of the world." Coleman, supra note 34, at
71 (quoting D.C. HOLTOM, MODERN JAPAN AND SHINTO NATIONALISM, 7, 20
(1947)). Domestically, Buddhism and Christianity were objects of suspicion,
the first being closely aligned with the era of the discredited Tokugawa
Shogunate's national government, and the second with Western Imperialism.
Coleman, supra note 34, at 72. And while Buddhism and Christianity retained
some security by nature of sheer numbers, smaller sects, which the authorities
labeled "pseudo-religions" (ruiji shukyo) or "evil cults" (jakyo), were subject to
the severest governmental repression-repression that soon expanded to
smaller sects of Christianity, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the
Holiness Church. Sheldon Garon, State Religion and Imperial Japan, 19121945, 12 J. JAP. STUD. 273, 300 (1986).
53. Garon, supra note 52. Under the Religious Organizations Law of 1939,
the government assumed power to disband any religious organization whose
teachings or actions were deemed, as Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichiro put
it, "at odds with the spirit of [the] Imperial Way." Id. at 301. A 1940 law
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conscripted" religious institutions to "collect donations for the war,
console families of the dead, and proselytize on the [Asian]
continent in the name of Japanism."5 4 Religious institutions were
regulated by the same standards as labor unions, political parties,
and most other autonomous organizations.5 5 By means of the
Special Higher Police force and "thought procurate" established in
1930 to control "dangerous" thought, the wartime Japanese
government destroyed any religious groups that refused to accept
the state orthodoxy.56
Professor Coleman cites the Soviet Union as well as
Revolutionary France as principal examples of secular civil
religions imposed by the state.5 7 In the Soviet Union, as another
author writes, "the quasi-religion of Communism expelled
traditional religion from the public space, which it filled with its
own symbols, rites, and doctrines."5 8 This Soviet civil religion had
its own saints (Lenin), sacred feasts (May Day), and a belief in the
state's "special role in unfolding world history as the spearhead of
the socialist revolution," 59 and was used to justify "severe
restrictions on religious and civil liberties" 60 and open persecution
of traditional religions.6 1 A similar effort at eradication of private
religious expression and practice occurred in the People's Republic
of China with the ascendance of Maoism. 62
Revolutionary France during the period of Jacobin rule in the
1790's (which culminated in the Reign of Terror) provides another
example. Under Jacobin rule, what Rousseau had called the
"general will' became a secular religion, which the political

formally elevated the authority of State Shinto over other religions: "[a]fter
decades of denying that State Shinto was a religion, the statist Konoe Cabinet
declared that it was the religion." Id.
54. Id. at 300.
55. Drawn together under the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the
Ministry of Education, which had gained the power to license all religious
groups, compelled the twenty existing Christian denominations to merge into
two, and the fifty-six Buddhist sects to organize themselves into twenty-three.
Id.
56. These actions were accomplished under the authority of the Religious
Organizations Law of 1939 and the revised Peace Preservation Law of 1941.
Id. at 301-02.
57. Coleman, supra note 34, at 72-73.
58. Alexander Agadjanian, Public Religion and the Quest for National
Ideology: Russia's Media Discourse, 40 J. FOR THE SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 3,
351 (2001).
59. Coleman, supra note 34, at 73.
60. Id. at 71.
61. Id. at 72.
62. Jiping Zuo, PoliticalReligions: The Case of the Cultural Revolution in
China, 52 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 1, 101 (Spring 1991) available at
http://socrel.oxfordjournals.org/content/52/1/99.full.pdf+html?sid=8b3Ocb4b07f
5-4d9a-a925-24603fba7c5a.
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leadership sought to guide and formalize. 63 Indeed, the term "civil
religion" was seemingly first transcribed in the 1762 publication of
Rousseau's Social Contract.64 In 1881, during France's Third
Republic, "the state supported the deist religion of the Masons and
Comte's religion of positivism as substitutes for an anti-modern
Catholicism," going so far as to laicize all education in France; in
the end, however, secular substitutes have never fully supplanted
65
nominal Catholicism from its place as France's civil religion.
The French Revolution created a civil religion that
foreshadowed modern nationalism, and at the extreme, the
fascism of Mussolini and the Nazis.6 6 Coleman, oddly enough, did
not attempt to fit these movements into his typology of civil
religion.67 Nazi civil religion, at least, was clearly undifferentiated
and state sponsored 68-the only seriously debatable question is to
what degree it was secular. George Mosse, in his article Fascism
and the French Revolution, argues that German nationalism
primarily "used Christian terminology to express itself," and that
National Socialism was no exception:
[t]here was the 'resurrection of the Greater German Reich', 'the
blood of the martyrs', and constant appeals to providence. Hitler, at
one point, called the martyrs of the movement his apostles.
The so-called 'sacred chambers' (Weiheraume) in factories and big
businesses which were reserved for party festivities were arranged
like a church; where the altar would be, stood Hitler's bust and the
banners of eagles decorated with swastikas as the symbol of unity
69
between the nation and the nazi movement.
The abuses of civil religion by the Nazis, the Jacobins, the

63. George Mosse, Fascism and the French Revolution, 25 J. CONTEMP.
HIST. 5, 6 (1989).
64. ROBERT BELLAH, American Civil Religion in the 1970's, in AMERICAN
CIVIL RELIGION, supra note 31, at 255. Along with symbol-laden rites and

festivals, the Jacobins pursued an
increasing conformity [so that] the new order would not degenerate into
chaos: dress, comportment, and even songs were enlisted to support that
effort, and so were a multitude of organizations to which people were
supposed to belong. Eventually, the revolutionary armies further
strengthened the authority of the revolutionary state. Such conformity
was placed in the service of the passion for liberty, closely associated
with patriotism and the cult of reason.
Mosse, supra note 63, at 7.
65. Coleman, supra note 34, at 73.

66. MARCELA CHRISTI, FROM CIVIL TO POLITICAL RELIGION: THE
INTERSECTION OF CULTURE, RELIGION, AND POLITICS 198 (Wilfred Laurier
Univ.
67.
68.
69.

Press 2001).
Coleman, supra note 34, at 66-77.
CHRISTI, supra note 66, at 11.
Mosse, supra note 63, at 9.
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Soviets, and Maoists are notorious and need no further catalog in
this brief historical survey.
III. AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION
A. The Origins of American Civil Religion
Civil religion may be enshrined in law, or it may appear in
the history, habits, and customs of a people. The founding of the
American experiment contains both. Despite an almost universal
desire to prevent the creation of a national Church, none of the
Founders-Christian or deist-argued for the complete abolition of
all religious references from American public life.70 Distinctly
Christian religious establishments existed in many of the states.7
When reference was made to God, it was largely (as in the
Declaration of Independence) to the "Creator," "Nature's God," and
the "Supreme Judge of the world," rather than to a specific
sectarian deity.72 "It seems unlikely that this lack of Christian
reference was meant to spare the feelings of the tiny non-Christian
minority."73 More likely, the Framers were cognizant of the diverse
religious traditions in the Colonies, the persecution suffered at the
hands of national governments, and the political support needed
from all quarters to transform the colonies into a truly "United
States." As Professor Albert has written, "[tihe Clause evolved as a
practical necessity of the founding era, designed to neutralize the
volatility of the emergent union of religiously diverse and

70. See MEACHAM supra note 30, at 18-20 (explaining that private religious
beliefs were protected by First Amendment).
71. State-established churches existed and continued for decades after the
Constitution and Bill of Rights were ratified. See Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understandingof the Free Exercise Clause, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1410, 1436-37 (1990) (discussing that state-established churches
existed and continued for decades after ratification of Constitution and Bill of
Rights). Scholars have variously described state establishments as ranging
from six to ten at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. A summary of
the legal systems in each of the thirteen colonies may be found in Richard
Albert, American Separationism and Liberal Democracy: The Establishment
Clause in Historicaland ComparativePerspective, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 867, 88395 (2005). See also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., 374 U.S. at 255, n.20
(Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he last formal establishment, that of
Massachusetts, was dissolved in 1833"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99,
n.4 (1985) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (illustrating that state establishments
were prevalent throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries before
citing Mass Const. of 1780, Part 1, Art. III; N.H. Const. of 1784, Art. VI; Md.
Declaration of Rights of 1776, Art. XXXIII; R.I. Charter of 1663 (superseded
1842)).
71. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (citing Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 730
(1871)).

72. Id. at 23.
73. BELLAH, supra note 33, at 28.
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reciprocally distrustful colonies." 74 Thus, by granting a role for the
Federal Government in religion, or by emphasizing one doctrine
above another, however slight the reference, the Framers would
have run the untenable risk of interfering with the various
religious traditions that were, in fact, already "established" in
many colonies and, indeed, the viability of the proposed political
union of the Colonies.75
There was to be no national religious establishment, but this
also did not mean that the Constitution established a secular
state.76 The Constitution contained several direct or indirect
provisions relating to God and religion in the Attestation Clause,
the Oath and Affirmations Clause, the Sundays Excepted Clause,
and the Religious Test Clause.77 The state constitutions invariably
contained more explicit connections between God and government,
and laws and legislative acts frequently reflected the tenets of
established Christian religions.78 The God invoked in American
civil discourse at the time of George Washington was the God of
the Judeo-Christian tradition with providence expected to guide

74. Albert, supra note 70, at 925.
75. Federalism was an issue in the sense that all of the proposed
amendments reflected a shared desire to limit the powers of the federal
government vis-A-vis the states. But an amendment to restrict federal
power by prohibiting federal involvement in religious matters is not the
same thing as an amendment designed to preserve state establishments.
Steven K. Green, Religion Clause Federalism:State Flexibility Over Religious
Matters and the "One-Way Ratchet", 56 EMORY L.J. 107, 116 (2006) (quoting
John Witte, Jr., Facts and Fiction About the History of Separation of Church
and State, 48 J. CHURCH & STATE 15, 33 (2006)).
76. Seth Barrett Tillman, Blushing Our Way Past Historical Fact and
Fiction: A Response to Professor Geoffrey R. Stone's Melville B. Nimmer
Memorial Lecture and Essay, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 391, 399-400 (2010).
77. Id. at 393-98. Article 11 of a 1790 treaty negotiated with the Bey of
Tripoli, did state that "the government of the United States of America is not
in any sense founded on the Christian Religion"-thus characterizing America
to Muslims as a secular nation." MEACHAM, supra note 30, at 103. Article II,
Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the United States and the Bey and
Subjects of Tripoli of Barbary, Annals of Congress, 5th Congress, ratified June
7, 1797, states:
As the Government of the United States of America is not, in any sense,
founded on the Christian religion; as it has in itself no character of
enmity against the laws, religion, or tranquility, of Mussulmen; and, as
the said States never entered into any war, or act of hostility against
any Mahometan nation, it is declared by the parties, that no pretext
arising from religious opinions, shall ever produce an interruption of the
harmony existing between the two countries.
Id. For obvious reasons, this language may be more a product of diplomatic
necessity than an expression of the nature of religion to the government of the
United States.
78. Samuel W. Calhoun, Getting the Framers Wrong: A Response to
ProfessorGeoffrey Stone, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1, 8-10 (2009).
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and intervene in the affairs of men.7 9 Interwoven into the ideas of
the Founders were Enlightenment rights theories, the ideas of
civic republicanism, the Book of Common Prayer, and the Biblefoundations that included tenets of sectarian religion, but broader
ideas as well.8 0 As George Washington recognized,
The foundation of our Empire was not laid in the gloomy age of
Ignorance and Superstition, but at an Epocha when the rights of
mankind were better understood and more clearly defined, than at
any former period, the researches of the human mind, after social
happiness, have been carried to a great extent, the Treasures of
knowledge, acquired by the labours of Philosophers, Sages and
Legislatures, through a long succession of years, are laid open for
our use, and their collected wisdom may be happily applied in the
Establishment of our forms of Government; the free cultivation of
Letters, the unbounded extension of Commerce, the progressive
refinement of Manners, the growing liberality of sentiment, and
above all, the pure and benign light of Revelation, have had a

meliorating influence on mankind and increased the blessings of
Society.8 1
Yet while the Founders nevertheless laid groundwork that
has supported an American Civil Religion (and many of the most
sacred rituals, symbols, and heroes of the Republic have their
origins in this period), the existence of varying state religious
establishments also produced a Bill of Rights with the
Establishment Clause that essentially "forbade" a national
church. 82 In this regard, Justice Souter recently observed that,
"Justice Story probably reflected the thinking of the framing
generation when he wrote in his Commentaries that the purpose of
the Clause was 'not to countenance, much less to advance,
Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating
Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects."'83
The Framers thus recognized Divine Providence and allegiance to
God in the successful founding of the country, 84 but avoided
sectarian references because of the religious establishments in the
states. 85 It was during and immediately after the Civil War that a
79. Id.

80. Maddigan, supra note 29, at 321.
81. Letter from George Washington, Commander in Chief of the Armies of
the United States of America, to the governors of all the states on disbanding
the army (June 8, 1773) in WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 214-15
(Lawrence B. Evans ed., Knickerbocher Press 1908) (emphasis added).
82. Robert G. Natelson, The OriginalMeaning of the Establishment Clause,
14 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS J. 73, 125 (2005).

83. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 880 (2005) (citing ROBERT L.
CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT
FICTION 13 (1988) (emphasis omitted)).

84. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 893-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. AKHIL REED AMAR,
RECONSTRUCTION 32 (1998).
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national civil religion became even more firmly established in
custom and practice, as well as in law.86
Prior to the Civil War, citizen allegiance rested largely at the
state and local level-with Americans generally saying "the
United States are a republic."87 Before the war, American flags
were confined to merchant and naval ships, and virtually nonexistent in homes and churches.88 It was the Civil War that
created a modern nation-state in an America where before there
had been many separate nations under one federal government.89
And it is the American Civil Religion that has, since the Civil War,
served "primarily [as] a justification of that historical
development."9 0
At first, the war was a limited one aimed at the very practical
goal of preserving the Union. Eventually, however, it became a
"moral crusade for freedom."91 With both sides looking to God for
providential guidance, many Americans turned to religion-and
such religious ideas were not restricted to the preacher's pulpit.92
The culmination of this process occurred with Lincoln's Second
3
Inaugural Address, now a sacred part of American Civil Religion.9
In a rare acknowledgment of God's critical nature, Lincoln noted
wearily that the war was perhaps God's judgment on the nation
for its sin of slavery, and wisely refrained from claiming that God
was on the side of the Union. 94 What is now seen as a messianiclike role, it was Lincoln's wisdom to plead eloquently with the
nation to return to its providential destiny and "strive on to finish
the work we are in, to bind up the nation's wounds."95 Indeed, in
modern parlance, Lincoln's inaugural address was far more
sectarian than those that have recently been censored by the
federal courts.96 He liberally relied on the Holy Scriptures to
persuade, warning that "[w]oe unto the world because of offenses;
for it must needs be that offenses come, but woe to that man by
86. MARK NOLL, THE CIVIL WAR AS A THEOLOGICAL CRISIS, 25 (Univ. of
North Carolina Press, 2006).
87. STOUT, supra note 2, at xxi.
88. Id. at 28 (citing CECELIA O'LEARY, To DIE FOR THE PARADOX OF
AMERICAN PATRIOTISM 20-25 (Princeton 1999).
89. Herbert Richardson, Civil Religion in Theological Perspective, in
AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION, supra note 31 at 161, 168.
90. Id.
91. STOUT, supra note 2, at xvi.
92. See generally id. at xxi-xxii (arguing that horror of war drove
individuals to subconsciously link patriotism to Christianity).
93. Id. at 270.
94. Id. at xvi.
95. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, Second Inaugural
Address (Mar. 4, 1865).
96. See, e.g., McComb, 320 Fed. Appx. at 507 (dismissing claim of
valedictorian censored in part for including two scripture verses in valedictory
at high school graduation ceremony and mentioning Jesus Christ).
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whom the offense cometh," and also, "the judgments of the Lord
are true and righteous altogether."9 7
The war continued, however, with many coming to see it as a
baptism by blood-where casualties became martyrs for the Union
and sacrifice part of the messianic destiny of the nation-state.9 8
For Horace Bushnell, a prominent Northern clergyman at the
time, the bloodshed was "something mystically religious and moral
that was creating a nation where only inchoate states and loose
confederations had previously existed."9 9 For the North, the
preservation of the Union became an all-encompassing goal-to be
accomplished at any cost.100 To bind the Union-from New York to
Chicago and down to New Orleans-there had to be a unifying
force driving men to fight for the idea of a nation. For the South,
this Union worship was often viewed as a form of idolatry. 101 Yet
the South too found it crucial to appeal to God and articulate its
mission in transcendent, moral terms. 102 The Confederacy made
its civil religion much more overtly Christian- "substituting a
gospel of the stars and stripes for the gospel of Jesus Christ."103
Despite calls for a Christian Republic in the North-to ensure God
would continue to side with the Union -Lincoln maintained the
non-sectarian civil religion inherited from the Founders.104
Lincoln's death made him a martyr for the Union cause,
entrenching his memory in the American psyche. Immediately
after the war, the focus turned to his moral achievements-some
calling him a "moral genius" and others noting his Christ-like lack
of malice or revenge toward the South.O5 "Through his death, an
97. Lincoln, supra note 95.
98. STOUT, supra note 2, at 250.
99. Id. at 249.
100. Id. at 459.
101. Id. at 54.
102. See id. at xxi-xxii (explaining views held by many southern preachers
that God supported Confederate States and that Lincoln was guilty of idolatry
for worshiping the idea of a union above God).
103. Id.
104. Id. at xi-xxii (introducing role of religion in Civil War and discussing
Lincoln's speeches and public stance on God and the War).
105. Id. at 453. Given the bloodshed and deep antagonism between North
and South during the Civil War, one of the most surprising aspects of dialogue
during the war was the virtual absence of a demonizing of the other sideneither side, for example, referred to the other as the Antichrist (as many had
called King George III during the Revolution). Id. at 94. This phenomenon
suggests either the brilliance and compassion of Lincoln or points to perhaps
an even greater desire that some would say is central to the American Civil
Religion-the hope of uniting Christians, Jews, and others under an American
creed that would make the post-war livable together. It could be argued that it
was only because of the emerging national religion that the Union was able to
recover from the Civil War as a whole. Certainly, without such moral
inspiration, the Southern states may never have fully rejoined the American
project-and, ultimately, the North American continent could have been
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innocent Lincoln became transformed from the prophet of
America's civil religion to its messiah."e06 With his message that
America was the world's last best hope, many have seen Lincoln as
one who brought into being what God had ordained and the
Founders (like Old Testament prophets during America's "Exodus"
period) had prepared the way for-a united republic committed to
bringing about God's will on earth. 0 7 Lincoln's Second Inaugural
Address became a national sermon, not only "explain[ing] America
to itself, but also explain[ing] it to the world." 0 8 In addition, his
Gettysburg Address represented the Civil War's "innermost
spiritual meaning."109 Together, these two documents stand as
evidence of the formation of a Union, "under God," bound by
transcendent moral ideas rather than religious or ethnic unity.
B. A Glimpse of the Sociology of American Civil Religion
Civil religion is arguably the primary source from which
Americans draw their personal and group identity.110 For example,
on November 26, 1963, the headline across the front page of the
New York Times was solemn: "New York Like a Vast Church.""'
Two years earlier, President John F. Kennedy had concluded his
inauguration address by calling on the American people to ask
God's blessing, "knowing that here on earth God's work must truly
be our own."1 12 This sentiment was hardly an attempt to establish
a broad-based civil religion, but to appeal to deeply held individual
convictions to improve society. In the context of Kennedy's
subsequent assassination, the mourning of the nation and its near
universal participation in a decidedly Catholic funeral,113
sociologist Robert Bellah in his 1967 essay "Civil Religion in
America" declared that America did, indeed, have a civil
religion.114 Bellah's arguments, which were heavily influenced by
Durkheim,"is viewed this civil religion then as co-existing with the
many sectarian, ecclesiastical religions of the nation's populace,
except that this supposedly "larger" religion served to bind a vastly
fractured into much smaller ethnic and religious nations under a weak,
struggling federal government.
106. Id. at 455.
107. See BELLAH, supra note 33, at 30 (arguing that Lincoln "embodied
[national meaning] for Americans").
108. STOUT, supra note 2, at 428.
109. Id. at 270.
110. SIDNEY MEAD, Nation with the Soul of a Church, in AMERICAN CIVIL
RELIGION, supra note 31, at 45, 70.
111. RICHARD PIERARD, CIVIL RELIGION AND THE PRESIDENCY 1 (Academie
Books, 1988).
112. BELLAH, supra note 33, at 21-22.
113. PIERARD, supra note 111, at 19.
114. BELLAH, supra note 33, at 21.
115. See generally id. (acknowledging Durkheimian ideals).
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diverse group of believers together.116 This has, no doubt, changed
even in the last few decades when successive waves of immigration
have altered social perceptions. However, many adherents of
American Civil Religion still perceive the United States primarily
as a Christian nation.11 7 During the Civil War, a powerful
movement for a "Christian amendment" developed that would
have had the Constitution acknowledge, not just God, but Jesus.118
In one brief foray shortly after the Civil War, even the U.S.
Supreme Court declared, with little enduring effect, that America
is a "Christian Nation."119
Despite the perception of many Americans, the American
Civil Religion is not Christianity-though Christianity, and more
specifically Protestantism, has served as a substantial source of
influence. 120 Every single presidential inaugural address has
mentioned God-but none have mentioned Jesus or made any
sectarian references.121 It has been argued that the God of
American Civil Religion evolved to have "almost nothing in
common with the God of Christianity" but instead, became
"understandable and manageable, comforting, and an American
jolly good fellow."122 Quite notably, and in contrast with the just
God of the Old Testament, reflected also in the New Testament,
this God is virtually never critical or condemning-and seems
116. See id. at 26 (stating that American Civil Religion transcended religious
differences of populace). "Rather than simply denounce what seems in any
case inevitable, it seems more responsible to seek within the civil religious
tradition for those critical principles which undercut the ever present danger
of national self-idolization." ROBERT N. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON
RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONALIST WORLD 168 (1991).

117. Michael Lind, America is not a Christian nation, SALON.COM,
(last
http://www.salon.comInews.opinion/feature/2009/04/14/christian-nation
visited Jan. 2, 2011).
118. See STOUT, supra note 2, at 373 (pointing to influence of Christianity on
American Civil Religion during Civil War); in ordaining the Constitution of
the Confederate States of America, its Preamble invoked "the favor and
guidance of Almighty God." See Yale Law School, Avalon Project, Constitution
of the Confederate States; March 11, 1861, http://avalon.law.yale.edull9th ce
ntury/csacsa.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2011) (referencing Confederate
Constitution).
119. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
120. BELLAH, supra note 33, at 28.
121. Maddigan, supra note 29, at 322.
122. PIERARD, supra note 111, at 287. In Van Orden v. Perry, the Supreme
Court recognized a dual purpose behind the State of Texas' display of the Ten
Commandments on its State Capitol grounds:
Texas has treated her Capitol grounds monuments as representing the
several strands in the State's political and legal history. The inclusion of
the Ten Commandments monument in this group has a dual
significance, partaking of both religion and government. We cannot say
that Texas' display of this monument violates the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005).
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often in full support of the American cause regardless of any moral
shortcomings.123 On the other hand, it is evident as well that in
times of national strife and war such as the Civil War period, "[bly
linking patriotism to Christianity and paying lip service to the
superiority of the eternal over the temporal, ministers and people
could embrace the new faith without fully acknowledging exactly
what they were doing."1 24
While the American Civil Religion borrows from religious
traditions in such a way "that the average American [sees] no
conflict between the two,"125 the Religion is not a least-commondenominator among major religious groups.126 Rather, it is
American, and has its own creation story, rituals, martyrs, totems,
and sacred texts.127 At its very core, and in spite of the clarion call
of the Declaration of Independence, the realistically beautiful, yet
highly practical, design of the Constitution, and the noble
sentiments of Francis Scott Key written as the Flag withstood
assault at Fort McHenry, adherents of the American Civil Religion
imbue the Declaration, Constitution, and Flag with sacred origin,
transforming them into a sort of "Holy Trinity" of the American
Civil Religion.128 Instead of the viewing the Declaration of
Independence as a document that recognizes, as Thomas Jefferson
did that: (1) individuals possess a right to life, liberty, and
pursuing happiness from their Creator that pre-exists entering
into civil society;129 (2) the people have the right to selfgovernment; and (3) the governed have the right to sever

123. CONRAD CHERRY, GOD'S NEW ISRAEL: RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF
AMERICAN DESTINY 17 (Univ. of N. C. Press, 1998).
124. STOUT, supra note 2, at xxii.
125. BELLAH, supra note 33, at 34.
126. Yehuda Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE
L.J. 1237, 1247 (1986).
127. See Deborah K. Hepler, The Constitutional Challenge to American Civil
Religion, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 93, 102-04 (1996) (discussing traditions of
American Civil Religion).
128. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 11 (Princeton Univ. Press,
1988).
129. Madison regarded free exercise of religion as an "inalienable right" and
a "duty" that is "precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to
the claims of Civil Society." Id. In his Memorial and Remonstrance to the
Virginia legislature, Madison argued that:
Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must
be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe: And if a
member of Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate Association,
must always do it with a reservation of his duty to the general
authority; much more must every man who becomes a member of any
particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the
Universal Sovereign.
Id. This view comports with the rights declared in the Declaration of
Independence and the subsequent Virginia Declaration of Rights authored by
George Mason, with assistance from Madison. Id.
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themselves from any government that is based on the divine right
of kings-the Declaration is instead frequently viewed in more
transcendently inspirational terms as a commission to propagate
the democratic form of government abroad. 130
The Constitution is also portrayed as having sacred and
transcendent origins, a "divinely inspired" document that has
permeated American culture since the Founding. 13 ' In fact, one
common belief during the years of the early Republic held that the
Constitution was the most recent major covenant between God
and his people since the Abrahamic Covenant.132 In a 1987 speech
to the Church's 157th Semiannual General Conference entitled
"Our Divine Constitution" based on Joseph Smith's revelation that
God "'established the Constitution of this land,"' Ezra Taft Benson,
the President of the Church Of Jesus Christ Of Latter-Day Saints
(LDS), declared that it was drafted "'by the hands of wise men
whom I raised up unto this very purpose."1 33 Benson went on to
suggest that LDS members should
Reverence the Constitution of the United States as a sacred
document. To me its words are akin to the revelations of God, for
God has placed His stamp of approval upon it .... I testify that the
God of heaven sent some of His choicest spirits to lay the foundation
of this government, and He has now sent other choice spirits to help
preserve it.' 3 4
In civil religion, the Flag is also said to be the "title deed of
freedom," whose "blue is the blue of heaven, loyalty, and faith." 135
Elements of all three are reflected in The American's Creed
written in 1918 by William Tyler Page, a native Virginian whose
ancestors arrived in 1650. It begins "I believe in the United States
of America," and concludes "I therefore believe it is my duty to my
Country to love it; to support its Constitution; to obey its laws; to
respect its flag, and to defend it against all enemies." 3 6 Page
130. See, e.g., John J. Patrick, ERIC Digest, Teaching the Declaration of
(last
http://www.ericdigests.org/2003-4/independence.html
Independence,
visited Jan. 2, 2011) (stating that teacher should "emphasize that the
Declaration of Independence has global significance because it set a standard
for liberty and justice under law to which all people in the world may aspire.").
131. LEVINSON, supra note 128, at 14.
132. Id. at 11.

133. Benson's authority for this statement is Section 101:80 of The Doctrine
And Covenants Of the Church of Jesus Christ Of Latter-Day Saints, based on
a revelation of God given to Joseph Smith, the Prophet, at Kirtland, Ohio,
December 16, 1833. See Doctrine and Covenants 101, http://scriptures.lds.org/
dc/101/80#80 (last visited Jan. 2, 2011) (indicating where Benson's quote came
from).
134. Benson's speech is published in an article, Ezra Taft Benson, Our
Divine Constitution, ENSIGN, Nov. 1987, at 4.

135. Ruth Apperson Rous, l am the Flag, USFLAG.ORG, http://www.usflag.or
g/iamtheflag.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2011).
136. William Tyler Page, The American's

Creed,

USFLAG.ORG,
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described it as "the summary of the fundamental principles of the
American political faith as set forth in its greatest documents, its
worthiest traditions, and its greatest leaders." 137 Commingling too
closely the distinctly Judeo-Christian aspirations of the unique
value of each of God's creation, on the one hand, with the political
right of each person to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,
on the other, may easily transform a universal religious truth into
faith in a "political truth" that is no less deserving of worship than
that which is traditionally reserved to the Creator.
It has been said, perhaps unfairly, that the novitiate
seminaries for American Civil Religion are the public schools,
where the foundations of American ideals are often taught without
distinction and meant to be established. 138 The Code of Virginia
requires, for example, that "Virginia's unique role in the history of
the United States, the Declaration of American Independence, the
general principles of the Constitution of the United States,
including the Bill of Rights, the Virginia Statute of Religious
Freedom, the charters of April 10, 1606, May 23, 1609, and March
12, 1612, of The Virginia Company, and the Virginia Declaration
of Rights shall be thoroughly explained and taught by teachers to
pupils in public elementary, middle, and high schools."139 Students
are further required to learn the history and principles of the flag
of the United States, as well as the Pledge of Allegiance and the
appropriate etiquette and conventions for respecting the dignity
and appropriate display of such flags. 140
Most would not find fault with these requirements and in fact
would deem them properly taught for an educated citizenry.
Instilling awareness and knowledge of American history,
traditions, and leaders is necessary for the advancement of a
cohesive national character and culture. If that history, however,
is viewed as infallible, the traditions, inerrant, and the heroes
revered to xenophobic ends, instruction may morph into state
worship. And when public officials motivated by patriotic
sentiment, whether in the executive, legislature, or the judiciary,
intervene to inhibit or prohibit free speech that expresses
differences or dissent from these traditions, there may arise a
formal, coercive establishment of civil religious exercise imposed
by raw state power.
Other earmarks of American Civil Religion are seen in the
national calendar which includes religious holidays, as well what
some would view as the holy days of the civil religion-Flag Day,
http://www.usflag.org/americancreed.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2011).
137. Id.
138. JOHN F. WILSON, PUBLIC RELIGION INAMERICAN CULTURE 126 (Temple
Univ. Press, 1979).
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-201 (West 2010).
140. Id. at § 22.1-202.
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the Fourth of July, and Thanksgiving.141 Memorial Day is a day
set aside to remember and honor those who have sacrificed and
given their lives to the defense of freedom. Some view it more
cynically, however, as a rite for a "cult of the dead . . . [dead who]
symbolically elaborat[ed] sacrifice of human life for the country." 142
The Office of the President is also intimately linked with the Civil
Religion. One observer contends its occupant serves, all at once, as
its "principle prophet, high priest, first preacher, and chief
pastor."143 And for those who serve in office, including the
President, loyalty oaths under Article VI of the Constitution are
viewed as "creedal affirmations of [the] Constitutional Faith."1 44
While all this describes how the American Civil Religion may
be perceived and variously manifested, the spiritual heart of the
creed lies for many in one central idea: that America is a nation,
chosen by God, to bring about his will on earth and serve as an
agent for liberty. America was founded, the creed holds, to be an
example of and primary actor in spreading its form of civic
republicanism. 145 America is also to be a refuge to the worldallowing those who accept its promise of liberty to come and
participate in this great historical experiment.146 As Bellah
observed, "Europe is Egypt; America, the promised land."l 47 The
God of the American nation is, Jefferson said, "as Israel of Old,"
bound to the American nation and endowing them with the sacred
rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 148 America is
seen, essentially, as "God's New Israel."149 The American way of
141. STOUT, supra note 2, at xix.
142. W. Lloyd Warner, An American Sacred Ceremony, in AMERICAN CIVIL
RELIGION, supra note 31, at 89, 111.
143. PIERARD, supra note 111, at 25; "Martin E. Marty has suggested that
there are two forms of civil religion-the 'priestly' and, the 'prophetic.' Marty
maintains that most politicians tend to assume the priestly role. [Journalist
James] Reston sees the role of the fourth estate as a prophetic one in creative
tension with the politicians." Leo Sandon, Jr., James Reston: Prophet of
American Civil Religion, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Jan. 5-12, 1977, at 15.
144. LEVINSON, supra note 128, at 90.
145. See WILSON, supra note 138, at 29-30 (differentiating between the
"exemplary" strand of America's mission-the isolationist view that America is
to stand as an example to the world-and the "emissary" strand-that
American civilization needs to be spread throughout the world). See generally
Jim Wallis, Dangerous Religion: George W. Bush's Theology of Empire,
SOJOURNERS MAGAZINE, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 20 (noting that to the
consternation of many, President George W. Bush followed the Wilsonian
emissary tradition).
146. See generally MEACHAM, supra note 30, at 24-25 (illustrating
foundation of his thought).
147. Id. at 25.
148. Id. at 22.
149. See generally CHERRY, supra note 123, at 19 (arguing that "history of
American Civil Religion is history of conviction that American people are
God's New Israel, his newly chosen people."). Professor Robert Wuthnow
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life-unique in being founded on a creed-is thus a prophetic idea,
an idea recognized by Sidney Mead in his essay Nation with the
Soul of a Church, that the nation is God's "primary agent for
meaningful activity in history."15 0 And throughout American
history-from Manifest Destiny and westward expansion to the
victories against totalitarianism in the 20th Century-this notion
that America is God's chosen nation elected to bring liberty to the
world has seemed self-authenticating.151
Philosopher and law professor Martha C. Nussbaum proposes
a secular antidote to this viewpoint, arguing that "this emphasis
on patriotic pride is both morally dangerous, and ultimately,
subversive of some of the worthy goals patriotism sets out to serve
52
.... devotion to worthy ideals of justice and equality."1 She offers
a "cosmopolitan" paradigm for Americans as "citizens of a world of
human beings" with allegiance to what is right and just for
humanity, rather than to parochial state concerns.153 This devotion
to humanistic universality has sparked disagreement on a number
of levels. Professor Benjamin R. Barber notes that "America's civic
nativism is . . . [already] a celebration of internationalism,

a

devotion to values with cosmopolitan reach." 54 Professor Hilary
Putnam suggests that patriotism of the "best kind" is
"indispensable," because without it, there is "no way to distinguish
between what should be saved and what should be scrapped from
overbearing
that
Arguing
traditions." 55
various
our
cosmopolitanism is no less dangerous than unrestrained
patriotism, Professor Michael Walzer observes that
[t]he crimes of the twentieth century have been committed
alternately, as it were by perverted patriots and perverted
cosmopolitans. If fascism represents the first of these perversions,
communism in its Leninist and Maoist versions, represents the
second .

. .

. A particularism that excludes wider loyalties invites

immoral conduct, but so does a cosmopolitanism that overrides
narrower loyalties.156
And drawing from Odysseus' epic journey home, poet Robert
Pinsky attempts a more uncomfortable answer: "It is the appeal of
points to "Herman Melville's much-read novel White-Jacket, for example,
[which] described Americans as 'the Israel of our time' and the nation as a
'political Messiah' sent as an advance guard to 'bear the ark of the liberties of
the world." Wuthnow, Divided We Fall: America's Two Civil Religions, THE
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Apr. 20, 1988, at 395, 396.
150. MEAD, supra note 110, at 68.
151. PIERARD, supra note 111, at 60.
152. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS

OF PATRIOTISM 4 (Joshua Cohen ed. 1996).
153. Id.

154. Id. at 33.
155. Id. at 96-97.
156. Id. at 126-27.
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unknown coasts and islands that counterbalance the love of our
Ithaca-which is itself an unknown island, terrible and
alluring."157 Or is it? Judge (now Professor) Michael W. McConnell
returns with a familiar refrain:
What better models of cosmopolitan virtue can we find for our
children than those we celebrate in our public holidays, whether
Washington or Lincoln or King? The particular pride of being an
American is based on self-evident truths of universal application
and in the appropriation of parts of the cultures of peoples, our
ancestors, from every corner of the globe. What a mistake it would
58
be to cast this aside!'

C. Is an American Civil Religion Necessary and Inevitable?
Many of those who have studied and described the American
Civil Religion, including Bellah, have become ardent supporters of
the concept--describing it as necessary and inevitable in a
pluralistic society. 15 9 By emphasizing what Americans have in
common, the Civil Religion has "been an effective deterrent to the
destructive forces present when individuals derive their identity
and sense of community from small and diverse groups." 60 As a
nation so diverse-much more so than perhaps even the Founders
could have envisioned-the uniting force of a Civil Religion binds a
diverse nation together and drives it toward a common goal. The
Civil Religion may also serve to legitimize the government and the
law. Phillip Hammond, Bellah's co-author, describes how the early
courts had to frame legal institutions in the form of morality and
the sacred. 6e To avoid conflict in a religiously diverse nation,
however, not just one religion could be chosen to provide this
moral foundation-hence the need for a non-sectarian civil
religion.162 And even if Civil Religion is found to be undesirable, it
may be nonetheless unavoidable-it may be, as Durkheim
63
describes, a transcendent social force with a life of its own.1
Prominent political commentator Rabbi Yehuda Mirsky noted that
a public religion responds to a direct need for religious symbols
and rhetoric "in a disestablished republic." 64
Many scholars have also noted the positive effect Civil
Religion has had in fostering an appreciation for liberty and

157. Id. at 90.
158. Id. at 83.
159. See generally, BELLAH, supra note 33, at 29 (noting that civil religion is
important in setting precedents among other pluralistic religions).
160. Hepler, supra note 127, at 94.
161. ROBERT N. BELLAH & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, VARIETIES OF CIVIL
RELIGION 151-61 (1980).
162. Id. at 103-04.
163. Mirsky, supranote 126, at 1248.
164. Hepler, supranote 127, at 104.
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republican values in the American citizenry. According to Jon
Meacham in American Gospel, the American Civil Religion is
unique in fostering "a habit of mind and heart that enables all
Americans to be at once tolerant and reverent." 165 Meacham
argues that the American Civil Religion-emphasizing the
importance of the individual and his or her moral virtue-is the
reason why America has far fewer problems than other nations in
maintaining a free society. 66 Without Civil Religion, patriotism
could devolve to its basest form-blind nationalism based on
ethnic and religious divisions. Instead, American patriotism is
infused with the noble goals of fostering liberty and establishing a
"City on the Hill."167 Meachem argues that these foundational
ideals-derived from Civil Religion-are what allowed the relative
success of the Civil Rights movement. 168 Thus, from the Civil War
to the Civil Rights era, throughout America's most tumultuous
times, the unifying nature of the Civil Religion has arguably had
some impact on holding the nation together in the face of division
and strife.
The recent affirmation of the constitutionality of the Pledge of
Allegiance to the Flag by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District169 stresses that the
Pledge "has the permissible secular effect of promoting an
appreciation of the values and ideals that define our nation. The
recitation of the Pledge is designed to evoke feelings of patriotism,
pride, and love of country, not of divine fulfillment or spiritual
enlightenment"170 and that the phrase "under God" in the Pledge
has "the predominant purpose and effect of adding a solemn and
inspiring note to what should be a solemn and inspiring promise of
allegiance to our Republic."171 In short, the court found the Pledge
to be designed to be a predominantly patriotic exercise, not a
religious activity. 172
165. MEACHAM, supra note 30.

166. Id. at 31.
167. Maddigan, supra note 29, at 321.
168. MEACHAM, supra note 30, at 191. President Lyndon B. Johnson's 1965
inaugural address reiterated the central tenet of the American Civil Religion
that America is "a Promised Land that [will] illuminate the world," and used
these ideas to rally Americans around his transcendent vision for the "Great
Society." Id. Throughout his presidency, Johnson asked what God would have
us do, and compared the events in Selma, Alabama to Lexington, Concord and
Appomattox. Id. 195-96.
169. 597 F.3d 1007, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010).
170. Id. at 1018.
171. Id. at 1019.
172. Id. at 1014. The Ninth Circuit majority described the purpose of the
Pledge as follows:
The Pledge of Allegiance serves to unite our vast nation through the
proud recitation of some of the ideals upon which our Republic was
founded and for which we continue to strive: one Nation under God-the
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Despite the apparent need for some form of Civil Religion to
bind a diverse, hugely expansive republic, like any ecclesiastical
creed, Civil Religion is easily susceptible to abuse. Rousseau
expressed concerns that such a national religion could become "an
idolatrous fraud perpetrated on naive believers."1 73 Bellah also
worried about the way in which such religious nationalism "was
used to support an idolatrous worship of the state." 1 7 4 Sidney
Mead in his famous essay Nation with the Soul of a Church,

warned that "our attitude toward the nation [may become]
idolatrous," and emphasized that the state must not become God,
lest it be able to abuse its power without recourse. 175 Mead did
contend that such idolatry was unlikely because of religious
pluralism-no one religious group could ever gain a monopoly on
the civil religion.17 6 Mead, however, seems to overlook the
possibility that the American religion itself could develop into a
state-sanctioned religion, with its own ultimate tenets,
monopolizing the beliefs deemed acceptable in public discourse.1 77
Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of civil idolatry is
its tendency to gloss over the faults and moral failings of a
country-allowing past injustices, and the lessons learned from
them, to fade from the collective memory. Meacham posits that the
emphasis on America as God's chosen people can offer "automatic
justification for any course the country wishes to take." 78 Even
Bellah, an ardent supporter of the Civil Religion, warned that it
could fall into "laudatory self-congratulation." 179 Such national
aggrandizement, he worried, could also slip into imperialism. 80
Founding Fathers' belief that the people of this nation are endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable rights; indivisible-although we
have individual states, they are united in one Republic; with libertythe government cannot take away the people's inalienable rights; and
justice for all-everyone in America is entitled to 'equal justice under
the law' (as is inscribed above the main entrance to our Supreme Court).
Id. at 1012.
173. Hepler, supra note 127, at 103.
174. Id. at 106.
175. MEAD, supra note 110, at 70.
176. Id. at 70-1.
177. Throughout American history, Christian ministers often warned
against worship of the state. In 1930 James M. Beck, in an address to the
American Philosophical Society, criticized Americans for putting the
Constitution in the same league as the Bible in being "infallible and
omnipotent." LEVINSON, supra note 128, at 14. From abroad, a number of Irish
Protestants during the Civil War viewed the primary American sin as "vainglorious devotion offered to the idol of the Constitution." NOLL, supra note 86,
at 98.
178. MEACHAM, supra note 30, at 27.
179. Richardson, supra note 89, at 164.
180. Id. He pointed to Richard Nixon's Second Inaugural Address, noting
how the address glossed over America's moral failings in Vietnam and was
essentially a "sustained hymn to American innocence." BELLAH, supra note 33,
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Social philosopher Will Herberg considered this a "super religion"
that validates America's choices "without in any sense bringing
them under judgment."18 1 The danger of blindly believing God is
always on America's side can lead to a nation-as some say the
South was-deaf to criticism and doomed to follow any misguided
policy adopted under the guise of national interest.
In addition to concerns of idolatry, groups on opposing ends of
the religious spectrum have throughout American history worried
about the specific content of the American Civil Religion. And
establishing a balancing act between these two groupspreventing the Civil Religion from being exclusive while
maintaining some substance that has relevance to the JudeoChristian majority-has often become a source of confusion for the
courts and government. 182 On the one hand, some traditional
Christian groups have complained that the civil religion is a
"'watered-down" version of Christianity devoid of any true
meaning-and therefore relevance. 183 With feelings that the Civil
Religion is "a fantastic degradation and parody of religion," the
risk of alienating the Judeo-Christian majority remains a real
concern.184 Following President Eisenhower's inaugural parade, a
writer for the Episcopal Church News commented on a display
trying to encompass the religious diversity of the country:
"Standing for all religions, it had the symbols of none." 8 5 To some,
dissatisfaction with this "empty and broken shell" of religion can
only lead to two acceptable results: a more sect-specific civil
religion or an abandonment of faith in the American creed
altogether. 86
On the other end of the spectrum, religious and non-religious
groups whose beliefs fall outside the "watered-down" JudeoChristian mold of the civil religion risk alienation. 8 7 Some see
"government-imposed unity around religious beliefs" as a clear
violation of the Establishment Clause.188 An atheist, for example,
may feel excluded by "the absorption of 'Christian ethnocentrism'

at 262. The danger of such an attitude was evident in the creation of the
inaugural speech itself-Nixon's Inaugural Committee had consciously chosen
not to mention Lincoln's Second Inaugural because it might remind of the
potentially embarrassing subject of American slavery. Id. at 260-1.
181. PIERARD, supra note 111, at 287.
182. Mirsky, supranote 126, at 1252.
183. CHERRY, supra note 123, at 15.
184. Mirsky, supranote 126, at 1254.
185. MEACHAM, supra note 30, at 178.
186. ROBERT BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION
IN TIME OF TRIAL 142 (The Univ. of Chi. Press 1992) (1975).
187. CHERRY, supra note 123, at 15.
188. The Harvard Law Review Association, Developments in the LawReligion and the State: III. Accommodation of Religious Public Institutions,
100 HARv. L. REV. 1639, 1659 (1987).
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in public institutions and the "ceremonial deism" that underlies
America's transcendent historical aspirations. 89 Echoing Justice

O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,190 the majority
opinions in Marsh v. Chambers'9 ' and Lynch,192 to some, stand as

a message to non-Christians that their ideas are generally not
welcome in the body politic. 93 Even among Christians, the Civil
Religion can often come into conflict with the dictates of
traditional religion-for example, when a Catholic naval officer
swears to defend the nation and is put in charge of nuclear
weapons, despite the Pope's insistence that they not be used.194
And in such cases, the Civil Religion requires such dissenters, if
they object, to "speak softly and stay out of sight." 95
Additionally, because the Civil Religion stems so much from
the European immigrant experience in America, minority
communities-whether Christian or not-may also feel isolated by
a Civil Religion with philosophical origins almost entirely
European.196 As Charles H. Long in his essay Civil Rights-Civil
Religion noted, "the religion of the American people centers
around the telling and retelling of the mighty deeds of the white
conquerors."197 The current day manifestation of his phenomenon
has likewise had an impact on new waves of immigrants. 9 8
189. Id.
190. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
191. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (upholding constitutionality
of the practice of legislative prayer).
192. See generally Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672 (allowing city's display of
Christmas decorations on public grounds, so long as such displays have
secular purpose).
193. Mirsky, supranote 126, at 1238.
194. See Pacem in Terris, Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on Establishing
Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity and Liberty, Apr. 11, 1967,
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-xxiiilencyclicals/document
s/hfj-xxiii enc_11041963-pacem.en.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2011) (stating
that nuclear weapons must be banned); see also Thomas J. White Center on
Law & Government, Nuclear Weapons, Lethal Injection, and American
Catholics: Faith Confronting American Civil Religion, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB POL'Y 7, 8-18 (2000) (explaining that Navy planned to remove
Catholic officers from command positions on nuclear submarines when
Catholic Bishop first circulated letter on nuclear weapons).
195. Id. at 16.
196. See generally Charles H. Long, CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL RELIGION: VISIBLE
PEOPLE AND INVISIBLE RELIGION, in AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION, supra note
31, at 212 (stating that American civil religion overlooks non-European
religions).
197. Id. at 214.
198. KAREN I. LEONARD, ET AL., IMMIGRATION FAITHS: TRANSFORMING
RELIGIOUS LIFE IN AMERICA (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press 2005); J. N.
Iwamura, Critical Faith: JapaneseAmericans and the Birth of a New Civil
Religion, AMERICAN QUARTERLY, Sept. 2007, at 937. One might argue that
religious and ethnic minorities need not fear-that they retain their First
Amendment rights and will not be persecuted for views that run contrary to
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Perhaps one of the primary reasons the American Civil
Religion has worked relatively well since the Civil War in binding
the nation together is that most Americans do not see it in conflict
with their own private religious traditions.19 9 It appears that
throughout much of our history, we have addressed religion's
somewhat ambiguous status in our constitutional system by
simultaneously erecting a more or less formally secular state while
publicly embracing 'civil religion' as a 'religion of the republic'
resonant with Judeo-Christian values and beliefs, but sufficiently
generic to unify large portions of the populace and become deeply
200
intertwined in our public rituals and ceremonies.
To the extent, however, that the American Civil Religion
becomes legally exclusive and coercive-that is, coercive in
demanding adherence to its own creed-Americans are subjected
to deprivations of civil liberties and forced to make unnecessary
choices of conscience. Recent court decisions declaring private
sectarian expression at publicly sponsored events as contrary to
the American "civic faith" are troubling, not only because
doctrinally they exempt government's expression of this American
"civic faith" from constitutional scrutiny (under the government
speech doctrine), but also because they discriminate against some
citizens by prohibiting them from expressing their own individual
faith on government property or at governmentally sponsored
events, when other citizens are permitted to make faith
201
statements that support tenets of American Civil Religion.
Much of this exclusion is being advanced in the name of
"government speech."

Eurocentric Judeo-Christian values. The danger, however, is not that
dissenters may be persecuted for what they believe, but rather what they do
not believe. The early Christians in Rome were persecuted not because they
worshiped Christ, but because "they refused to sacrifice to Caesar as the state
cult required." PIERARD, supra note 111, at 37.
199. See BELLAH, supra note 33, at 34-35 (stating that civil religion was built

up without any unpleasant struggle).
200. Bruce G. Peabody, Analogize This: PartialConstitutionalText, Religion,
And Maintaining Our Political Order, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 101,
105, available at http://www.cardozolawreview.com/index.php?option-com
content&view=article&id=140:peabody2OlO2O4&catid=18:ther-de-novo-articl

es&Itemid=20 (last visited Jan. 2, 2011).
201. MORRISON, supra note 7.
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IV. "GOVERNMENT SPEECH," AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION, AND
PRIVATE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION 202

A. Monument Speech as "Government Speech"
In its 2009 decision in City of Pleasant Grove v. Summum,

203

the Supreme Court of the United States charted new ground in the
area of government speech, admitting that "[n]o prior decision of
this Court has addressed the application of the Free Speech
Clause to a government entity's acceptance of privately donated,
permanent monuments for installation in a public park."204 The
request to display a permanent religious monument in a city park
came from the Summum religion and was based on equal access
principles arising from Pleasant Grove's decision to permit a
private group to display a monument with the Ten
Commandments. 205 Writing for the majority and synthesizing the
court's earlier decisions, Justice Samuel Alito declared
unequivocally that governmental entities have "the right to speak
for [themselves]," "to say what [they] wish," and "to select the
views that [they] want to express," even when joining in a venture
with a private party to advance what the Court viewed to be a
public message. 206 Justice Alito discerned that monuments located
on public property categorically send a governmental message and
are thus government speech. 207 He also declared: "A government
entity may exercise this same freedom to express its views when it
receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of
delivering a government-controlled message."208
At least three members of the majority expressed discomfort
with categorical government speech. Justice Breyer viewed "the
'government speech' doctrine [as] a rule of thumb, not a rigid
category." 209 Joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens also
expressed doubt about "the recently minted government speech

202. A portion of the discussion contained in Part IV(C) of this Article
(relating to political safeguards against abuse of the constitutional exemption
offered by the government speech doctrine reflects sentiments expressed in a
Brief of Amicus Curiae filed by the authors of this Article in Summum). Brief
of Rutherford Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665).
203. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1129.
206. Id. at 1131 (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991); Nat'l
Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998)).
207. Id. at 1129.
208. Id. at 1131.
209. Id.
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doctrine."210 Observing that the decision in the Summum case was
a departure from the ordinary application of the doctrine-in
situations involving coerced speech or compelled participation in
the funding of offensive messages-Stevens qualified his views on
government speech saying, "recognizing permanent displays on
public property as government speech will not give the
government free license to communicate offensive or partisan
messages." 211
210. Id.
211. Id. The concept of "government speech" (absent the terminology) was
arguably first employed in early Establishment Clause cases where the Court
held that governmental action advancing a religious message-such as the
prescribed New York Regent's prayer, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), or
Bible reading in schools, Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 205, or the posting of
the Ten Commandments, Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)-had the
purpose or effect of establishing religion. The term "government speech" was
mentioned directly in more of the recent Establishment Clause cases involving
private expression. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661
(1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
"government speech about religion is not per se suspect . . . ."); Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (stating that "[tihere
is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which
the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses protect."). The issue,
surfaced in earlier Free Speech cases as "compelled speech." See, e.g., Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (addressing "Live Free or Die" on New
Hampshire license plates); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)
(analyzing compelled union dues to advance political causes); Keller v. State
Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (reviewing use of mandatory dues to
advance political and ideological causes or beliefs). The origin of "government
speech" qua government advancing its own message context is more generally
recognized as beginning with Rust, where the Court upheld laws requiring
medical providers to distribute to persons seeking abortions certain statepromulgated information on family planning and counseling and the risks and
dangers of abortion. Rust, 500 U.S. at 203. Later, in Bd. Regents Univ.
Wisconsin Sys., the Court ruled that the First Amendment allowed a public
university to use a student-funded activity fee to support extracurricular
student speech, provided the program was viewpoint neutral. Bd. Regents
Univ. Wisconsin Sys, 529 U.S. at 221. And in Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,
the Court said that "advice from the attorney to the client and the advocacy by
the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as governmental speech even
under a generous understanding of the concept." Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542-43 (2001). There have been other cases relating
to government's ability to make decisions regarding messages in governmentfunded programs. See, e.g., Nat'1 Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 587-88
(allowing government to allocate competitive funding for artistic productions
according to criteria that would be impermissible for regulation of speech);
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (1995) (stating that where government speaks for
itself, it "may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message
is neither garbled nor distorted"). In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n, as
will be discussed in the text that follows, the Court found that a Department
of Agriculture program promoting beef and beef products through a targeted
tax on beef producers to be "government speech." Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005). In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
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The reserved support for the government speech doctrine in
the Summum concurrences reflected earlier qualms elaborated in
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n. 212 In that case, the Court
rejected a challenge by several agricultural associations to a
Department of Agriculture program advertising and promoting
beef and beef products through a targeted tax on all beef
producers. 213 The majority found that the program constituted
government speech because the statutory scheme and the process
by which the promotions were made demonstrated that "[t]he
message set out in the beef promotions is from beginning to end a
message established by the Federal Government." 214 Justices
Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg disagreed, reasoning that the
assessments would be more appropriately analyzed as permissible
economic regulation, and not as government speech. 215 Justice
Kennedy was likewise cautious, agreeing with Justice Souter that
the Department of Agriculture program was not government
speech, leaving "for another day the difficult First Amendment
questions that would arise if the government were to target a
discrete group of citizens to pay even for speech that the
2 16
government does 'embrace as publicly as it speaks."'

B. The Ill-Defined and PotentiallyIndefinable Boundariesof
"Government Speech"
The term "government speech" has to date been mentioned in
seven Supreme Court free speech cases, more often as a shield
protecting individual liberty interests under the Bill of Rights
against allegations of governmentally "compelled speech." 217 Its

and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), involving a challenge to a
statute requiring on campus military recruitment as a condition of Federal
higher educational subsidies, the Court noted the protection against compelled
speech runs to private speech, but not the funding of "military recruiters'
speech [which] is clearly Government speech." Id. at 61 n.4. Scholarly
commentary on "government speech" appears to have begun in the late 197 0s,
with a series of articles by Professors Yudof, Nowak, Shiffrin, Zeigler, and
Laycock, which are listed in Luther III & Caddell, supra note 18; see also,
Randal P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1422 (2001); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who's
Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 35, 97 (2002).
212. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n., 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
213. Id. at 567.
214. Id. at 556.
215. Id. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 570.
217. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1125 (2009); Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006);
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n., 544 U.S. 550 (2005); United States v.
United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
533 (2001); Board of Ed. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); Board of Ed. of
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more definitive extension in the Summum case to include
governmental endorsement of private speech, following the more
limited endorsement in the Johannscase, presents a new doctrinal
dimension deserving of careful scrutiny.
Justice Breyer articulated the difficulties with the
government speech doctrine in the pre-Johanns case, United
States v. United Foods, Inc. 218 "Nearly every human action that
the law affects, and virtually all governmental activity, involves
speech" and the Court "has distinguished among contexts in which
speech activity might arise, applying special speech-protective
rules and presumptions in some of those areas, but not in
others."219 In this type of situation, he cautioned, applying First
Amendment analysis to every type of government program,
particularly those dealing with commercial regulation, may pose
"a serious obstacle to the operation of well-established,
legislatively created, regulatory programs, thereby seriously
hindering the operation of that democratic self-government that
the Constitution seeks to create and to protect." 220 Faulty analysis
could lead to "less First Amendment protection" in some instances
and also create "an incentive to increase the Government's
involvement in any information-based regulatory program,
thereby unnecessarily increasing the degree of that program's
restrictiveness."221

Justice Alito acknowledged in Summum "the legitimate
concern that the government speech doctrine not be used as a
subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over others based
on viewpoint." 222 Justice Souter likewise noted that
the government could well argue, as a development of government
speech doctrine, that when it expresses its own views, it is free of
the Establishment Clause's stricture against discriminating among
religious sects or groups. Under this view of the relationship
between the two doctrines, it would be easy for a government to
favor some private religious speakers over others by its choice of
monuments to accept.
The tips of these legal icebergs are evident in numerous (and
likely to be legion) federal circuit court cases dealing with political,
social and religious speech. To date, government speech has been
claimed to be transmitted through religious symbols in public
parks and public buildings, marketing programs, candy canes,
license plates, plays and radio programs, graduation speeches, and

Westside Cmty. Sch., v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
218. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U. S. 405 (2001).
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 424.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 429.
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1125.
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legislative prayer. 223 Almost all of the courts addressing these

223. See, e.g., Westfield High School L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F.
Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 2003) (holding that candy canes distributed with
messages at Christmas are not government speech per se); Cochran v.
Veneman, 252 F. Supp. 2d 126 (M.D. Pa. 2003), affd sub nom. Cochran v.
Sec'y of Agric., 2005 WL 2755711 (3rd Cir. 2005) (reversing initial finding in
light of the Johanns ruling that Dairy Act promotional program constituted
private speech and thus compelled speech was subject to First Amendment
scrutiny); Modrovich v. Allegheny Cnty., 385 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding
that Ten Commandments plaque donated by private group for display at
courthouse constituted impermissible government speech); Planned
Parenthood of South Carolina v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding
that "Choose Life" license plates were not government speech); Simpson, 404
F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005) (deciding that County program inviting outside
ministers to provide legislative prayer was government speech); Pelts & Skins
LLC v. Landreneau, 365 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, vacated, 544
U.S. 1058 (2005), on remand, 448 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2006) (remanding in light
of Johanns, the initial finding that program promoting advertising of alligator
products reflected private rather than governmental interests and not a
governmental message crafted, controlled, and expressed by an agency); ACLU
of Tennessee v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that 'Choose
Life,' as it is to appear on the face of Tennessee specialty license plates, is a
government-crafted message because Tennessee "sets the overall message to
be communicated and approves every word that is disseminated" on the
'Choose Life' plate.); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 489 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding
that Ten Commandments monument donated by private group was
government speech that violated the Establishment Clause); Linnemeir v. Bd.
of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2001) (agreeing that choice of
campus play was government speech because University required performance
was advertised in a school sponsored news paper; was subject to University
control and took place on the campus of the University); KKK v. Curators of
the Univ. of Missouri, 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that public
underwriting acknowledgements constituted government speech where KKK
barred from serving as a group underwriter by public radio station that denied
their support); Arizona Life Coalition, Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir.
2008) (finding that Arizona's failure to approve a "Choose Life" special license
plate violated the Coalition's Free Speech rights); Paramount Land Co. LP v.
California Pistachio Comm'n, 491 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that
factual differences in actual oversight between the beef promotion scheme in
Johanns and the pistachio scheme in this case were legally insufficient to
justify injunction); Wells v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir.
2001) (holding that there was no cause of action where City of Denver
prohibited a sign promoting atheist views in a Christmas display as the
message advanced by the City "is the City's message to the community.");
Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding
that Florida license plate program is structured to benefit the organizations
that apply for and sponsor the plates, not the State itself, and there is
insufficient government attachment to the messages on Florida specialty
license plates to permit a determination that the messages represent
government speech); Alder v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 206 F. 3d 1070 (11th Cir.
2000) (holding that neutral mechanism whereby the students elect speaker to
give an unrestricted message does not establish an utterance of the state and
the student's speech is her own.); People For The Ethical Treatment of
Animals, Inc. v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (permitting District's
Commission on Arts and Humanities decision to deny group's sponsorship
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issues have reviewed factors such as the message to be
communicated, the means by which the communication is made,
and who crafts and controls distribution of the message.224 More
problematic now, however, in light of Summum's transformation of
a "private" message (the Eagles' Ten Commandment's monument)
into a "constitutionally exempt governmental message," is the
effect of permitting government to exclude or regulate competing
private messages in a public forum or governmental event in the
name of "government speech." Permanent monuments are vastly
different from the unlimited universe of situations where
government sponsors or controls events on its property, but
nevertheless permits private individuals to promulgate and
fashion event-related messages to be spoken. In what situations
does privately-promulgated speech in that context become
government speech? And by what criteria? And if government
"control" is the only touchstone, will the unique, privately
composed speeches of individual private speakers inexorably be
subject to censorship whenever presented on government property
or at governmentally-sponsored events?

C. The Need for Bright Lines
Justice Alito foresaw some of the line-drawing difficulties in
determining what is, and what is not, government speech, but
dismissed them with scenarios presenting relatively obvious
answers. 225 Yet the Court's decision to rationalize the Summum
package as regulation of government speech); Avocados Plus Inc. v. Johanns,
421 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding that Beef Act and the Avocado Act
identical in all relevant aspects, with the Secretary exercising same degree of
control over Avocado Board as he does over Beef Board).
224. See cases cited supra note 223 (summarizing decisions around the
country).
225. He raised, and dismissed, three obvious potential problems: The first
example being "the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund [which] is a private
organization that obtained funding from over 650,000 donors for the
construction of the memorial itself' whose donors, he said, "expressed a wide
range of personal sentiments in contributing money for the memorial"; the
second, where "a painting of a religious scene may have been commissioned
and painted to express religious thoughts and feelings," but, he said, "it does
not follow that the museum, by displaying the painting, intends to convey or is
perceived as conveying the same 'message'; and the third, the temporary
display of a cross by the Ku Klux Klan on the grounds of the Kentucky State
Capitol in Capitol Square Review, which he said "involved a very different
situation-a request by a private group, the Ku Klux Klan, to erect a cross for
a period of 16 days on public property that had been opened up for similar
temporary displays, including a Christmas tree and a menorah." Summum,
129 S. Ct. at 1138. In a subsequent case involving school censorship of an
instrumental performance of "Ave Maria" at a high school graduation, Justice
Alito dissented from the Court's denial of a writ of certiorari and seemed to
recognize that viewpoint discrimination principles apply in circumstances
where private speech occurs at publicly sponsored events. See Nurre, 580 F.3d

906

The John MarshallLaw Review

[43:869

decision using the government speech doctrine greatly amplifies
the likelihood that a myriad of free speech claims involving
government property or government sponsored events will now
include government speech defenses. The defense may arise where
government officials seek to exclude and restrict potentially
controversial speech, or limit access to forums open to other
private speakers privileged by government to speak, but under
restrictions or censorship it may now seek to impose in the name
of "government speech."
More than one jurist has properly recognized that "[w]hat is,
and what is not, 'government speech' is a nebulous concept, to say
the least."226 The complexities that arise from private speech on
government property are readily apparent in the many lower court
cases involving alleged "governmental messages."227 This is
because "[s]peech in fact can be, at once, that of a private
individual and the government." 228 The complex interrelationships between government and the private sector, and the
continuous intersection of government with individuals on public
property and at public events, frequently create ambiguities as to
whether a message is essentially a private or a public one. 229
at 356 (finding censorship of instrumental graduation performance of "Ave
Marie" in program containing eight other instrumental music pieces not
violation of Equal Protection).
226. Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Comm'r of the Virginia Dep't of Motor
Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 251 (4th Cir. 2004) (Gregory, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc).
227. See cases cited supra note 223 (summarizing Circuit cases).
228. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 305 F.3d at 245 (Luttig, J., respecting the
denial of rehearing en banc).
229. The lack of certainty concerning the applicability and boundaries of the
government speech doctrine is confirmed by the wide range of diverse opinions
in the federal circuits. Aside from the numerous differing opinions produced by
the Tenth Circuit in the Summum case, the Fourth Circuit has also struggled
for coherence on the doctrine. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 305 F.3d
241 (4th Cir. 2004) (analyzing Confederate Flag on Virginia license plates);
Planned Parenthood, 373 F.3d 580 (4th Cir. 2004) (reviewing Choose Life
message on South Carolina license plates). The panel decision in Sons of
Confederate Veterans, written by Judge Karen L. Williams, was unanimous,
but the petition for rehearing en banc, denied by a vote of six to five, revealed
the uncertainties. Judges J. Harvie Wilkinson III and J. Michael Luttig wrote
opinions concurring in denial, while Judges Paul V. Niemeyer and Roger L.
Gregory each wrote separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 242, 244, 247. In
Planned Parenthood, the panel hearing the case published three separate
opinions, and on petition for rehearing en banc, denied by a vote of eight to
five, Judge Wilkinson wrote an opinion concurring in the denial and Judge
Dennis W. Shedd wrote an opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc, which was joined by Judge Williams. Id. at 581. A similar pattern
occurred in Summum in the Tenth Circuit where the court was split on a
petition for rehearing en banc six to six, with three Judges issuing highly
diverse opinions as to the proper rationale for decision. Summum v. Pleasant
Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1171, 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2007).
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Government may be merely accommodating private speech,
facilitating or even endorsing the advancement of a private
message, or it may be promulgating a truly governmental
message.
Conversely, the voice of government may very easily be
advanced in league with private entities in a manner that
evidences no discernable connection of a message with government
though it is very much a governmental message. 230 Private entities
may thus assume roles as government advocates or unidentified
surrogates, disseminating messages that are difficult to trace to a
public author. The line between public speech and private speech
rights may thus be extremely difficult to discern. Chief Judge
Tacha of the Tenth Circuit identified the difficulty in the Tenth
Circuit's consideration of Summum:
[The government ownership] approach is an unprecedented, and
dangerous, extension of the government speech doctrine. To make
government ownership of the physical vehicle for the speech a
threshold question would turn essentially all government-funded
speech into government speech. But this would be an absurd result.
No one thinks The Great Gatsby is government speech just because
a public school provides its students with the text. This is because
the speech conveyed by the physical text remains private speech
23
regardless of government ownership. '

230. See Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56

L.J. 983, 983-84 (2005) for examples of the government's use of
private actors to advance its anti-drug message. The White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy reviewed the scripts of more than 100 episodes
of television shows such as "E.R.," "Beverly Hills 90210" and "Cosby" to make
sure the programs conveyed the "proper" anti-drug messages, in exchange for
which the networks received more than $20 million worth of credit for
required public service broadcasting. Id.
231. Summum, 499 F.3d at 1179 (Tacha, C.J., response to dissent from
denial of rehearing en banc). The difficulty in determining whether private
speech takes on a government character was reviewed in Wells, 257 F.3d 1132
(10th Cir. 2001), where the City and County of Denver erected a Christmas
display on the steps of the City and County Building through the sponsorship
of private business entities. An atheist group requested to place a Winter
Solstice sign "inside" the "Christmas display area" denigrating God and
religion. Analyzing the question under the government speech rubric, the
Court asked, who is the speaker? And if the speaker is the City or County,
does it control the content of the display? And if it does, is it government
speech? Two judges concluded that the government was the speaker because
Denver owned and maintained the entire display, erected the fence
surrounding the display, provided video cameras, motion detectors, and a
security guard to protect the display. The Court also found that "in Denver's
view, the display is the City's message to the community," id., at 1139, even
though the cost of the display was paid for by six corporate sponsors. The third
member of the Tenth Circuit panel dissented, in part because "the holiday
display is not solely government speech, but contains private speech . . . ."She
suggested that:
HASTINGS
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To accept the view that government ownership of property, or
control of a public event or forum, means that all speech in such
circumstances is categorically government sponsored, and
therefore, government speech, opens the door for mass viewpoint
discrimination, leaving government free to "accept any private
message as its own [or censor] without subjecting the message to
the political process, a result that would shield the government
from First Amendment scrutiny and democratic accountability." 232
To ensure political accountability, therefore, it is important to
require government to demonstrate that it intends not only to
control all of the private speech occurring on its premises, but that
it has specifically crafted the messages to be propagated. If it did,
there would be no First Amendment claim for viewpoint
discrimination; if it did not, the speech would be private speech, or
as Judge Michael Luttig and others have suggested, a "hybrid" of
government and private speech 233 (where government has opened
access to government property for messages with both private and
public content). These latter situations demand careful scrutiny.
The more appropriate and critical inquiry in most instances will,
and should, be whether a particular private message is a
government-crafted or adopted message that is intended to be
advanced to the exclusion of all other messages and otherwise
viewpoint
banning
requirements
meets
constitutional
discrimination. 234
Equality of access and government neutrality toward the
expression of viewpoints in the public square lies at the heart of
the First Amendment. As Professor Schauer has observed:
[A]lthough .

.

. drawing distinctions is an inevitable part of the

legislative, regulatory, and judicial enterprises, there remains a
pervasive American suspicion of official valuation of ideas and
enterprises. And while the libertarian culture that such attitudes of
To a passerby, the billboard does not appear to be from Denver, but from
the sponsors, all of whom are private entities. The billboard shows that
those private corporations have co-sponsored the holiday display, also
making the display their speech as well as Denver's speech.
Wells, 257 F.3d at 1155.
232. Summum, 499 F.3d 1170, 1180 (Tacha, C.J., response to dissent from
denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis added).
233. Although the Supreme Court has never recognized in so many words
the concept of public-private "hybrid speech," the idea that speech can be both
private and governmental at the same time has been recognized in the federal
circuits. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 305 F.3d at 245 (Luttig, J.,
respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (stating that "the particular speech
at issue in this case is neither exclusively that of the private individual nor
exclusively that of the government, but, rather, hybrid speech of both.").
234. See, e.g., Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560 (holding that the beef advertising
campaign constituted "government speech" because the "message set out in
the beef promotions is from beginning to end the message established by the
Federal Government.").
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distrust engender is hardly restricted to freedom of communication,
this skepticism about the ability of any governmental institution
reliably to distinguish the good from the bad, the true from the false,
and the sound from the unsound finds its most comfortable home in
the First Amendment. 235
Writing in a similar vein in a case involving a state
legislature's decision to deny the Confederate Flag symbol on a
vanity license plate, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, expressed
concern that "[w]hen a legislative majority singles out a minority
viewpoint in such pointed fashion, free speech values cannot help
but be implicated." 236 Moreover, the affront is more readily
apparent when the private speech being favored or disfavored falls
into certain categories. For example, in Planned Parenthood v.
Rose, involving a state-promulgated "Choose Life" license plate,
Judge Wilkinson noted that "[i]t is one thing for states to . . .
celebrate birds and butterflies, military service, historical events
and scenic vistas. It is quite another for the state to privilege
private speech on one side-and one side only-of a fundamental
moral, religious, or political controversy." 237 He continued:
The fact that Americans have deep differences of opinion .

.

. is all

the more reason to recognize the unifying force of the First
Amendment principle-namely, that none of us has the right to
compel assent to our views, but that all of us have the right to
express them. The state's failure to be neutral on the right to speak
about our most divisive issues will give rise to great resentment.
The confidence that all are treated equally with respect to belief,
conscience, and expression enables Americans to transcend
difference and to make 'e pluribus unum' the lasting legacy of our
238
nation.
This suggests that rigorous scrutiny should be applied to any
claim that speech can be censored or prohibited because it is
235. Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment 24 Faculty
Research Working Papers, JFK School of Government, Paper No. RWPO5-021

2005), available at http://ksgnotesl.harvard.edulResearch/wpaper.nsf/rwplRW
P05-021.

236. Judge Wilkinson explained his concern as follows:
[T]he First Amendment was not written for the vast majority .

. .

. It

belongs to a single minority of one. It is easy enough for us as judges to
uphold expression with which we personally agree, or speech we know
will meet with general approbation. Yet pleasing speech is not the kind
that needs protection . . . . The Constitution that houses the First

Amendment also shelters the Fourteenth, an everlasting reminder that
a nation betrothed to liberty and equal justice under law must remain
vigilant to realize both.
Sons of Confederate Veterans, 305 F.3d at 242 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in

the denial of rehearing en banc).
237. Planned Parenthood,373 F.3d at 581 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in the
denial of rehearing en bane).
238. Id. at 581-82.

910

The John MarshallLaw Review

[43:869

government speech. Government should be required to make clear
when it contends that it seeks to advance a private message (other
than through monument speech), just what message it is
specifically seeking to advance, what are its reasons for doing so,
and what is the basis for denying access to other groups or
messages in the same forum or with similar content. Otherwise,
the government speech doctrine provides an unrestricted and
convenient device to advance state orthodoxy and silence
disfavored views, diluting First Amendment protections and the
vitality of free speech. 239 If government is to speak through private
means, or permit domination of the public square by such means,
it should be required as a constitutional matter to adopt formally
the privately-promoted message as its own, and state a
compelling, viewpoint-neutral justification for doing so.
There is a further sound reason for the requirement that
government clearly identify speech as its own: political
accountability. 240 Individuals generally have no constitutional
right to challenge government speech under the Free Speech
Clause. 241 The justification for the government speech exemption
is that government speech is ordinarily subject to the political
scrutiny and accountability that is part and parcel of the First
Amendment's Petition Clause:
The latitude which may exist for restrictions on speech where the
government's own message is being delivered flows in part from our
observation that, '[w]hen the government speaks, for instance to
promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the
end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could
espouse some different or contrary position.' 242
Yet when the government hides its
political accountability behind the veil
transgresses the constitutional and
purportedly undergird the government

actions and messages from
of private party speech, it
democratic values that
speech doctrine. When the

239. It is important to remember that "[tlhe First Amendment is often
inconvenient . . . . Inconvenience does not absolve the government of its

obligation to tolerate speech." International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 701 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in judgment).
240. See Planned Parenthood, 361 F.3d at 795-96 (stating that "[t]he
government speech doctrine was not intended to authorize cloaked advocacy
that allows the State to promote an idea without being accountable to the
political process.").
241. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129 (U.S. 2009) (stating that "the
placement of a permanent monument in a public park is best viewed as a form
of government speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free
Speech Clause.").
242. Legal Serys. Corp., 531 U.S. at 541-42 (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of Wis. Sys., 529 U.S. at 235.
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political safeguards that justify government speech are removed,
the justification for exemption of government speech from
constitutional scrutiny under the Bill of Rights disappears. In such
circumstances, the protective shield of the government speech
doctrine should be set aside to avoid discriminatory decisionmaking.
When government grants access to public property for speech
in which it participates with private groups, that speech should
not benefit from a constitutional exemption unless: (1) it is
transparently advanced by government on the public record as its
own; and (2) the private message adopted as its own advances a
legitimate, rationally-related, non-discriminatory governmental
purpose.
By cloaking public messages with private voices, government
may surreptitiously distort discourse in the public square,
deceptively skewing the political process. Non-transparent
governmental communication more easily permits government to
avoid the repercussions of unpopular speech. And while the
government is likely to associate itself with a popular message, it
is all too easy without strict scrutiny for it to minimize the
political ramifications of an unpopular message simply by
advancing its interests covertly through a private speaker. 243
These methods contradict the political accountability that is "so
essential to our liberty and republican form of government." 244 As
Justice Souter has asked, if "[n]o one hearing a commercial for
Pepsi or Levi's thinks Uncle Sam is talking behind the curtain. . .
[wihy would a person reading a beef ad think Uncle Sam was
trying to make him eat more steak?" 245 The "First Amendment
harm cannot be mitigated by the possibility that a few cognoscenti
may actually understand how the [government speech] scheme
works." 246 The possibilities for government deception into the
everyday lives of this country's citizens through an unprincipled
government speech doctrine, particularly in an age of anonymous
technological communication, are of imperative constitutional
concern.
If government is clearly advocating on the public record a
private message that it has either adopted as its own or crafted,
the speech should be constitutionally exempt. But if government
cannot provide a relatively minimal evidentiary showing that the
message is truly its own, and define what that message is, there
should be no exemption from constitutional scrutiny. False
labeling or deliberate ambiguity in advancing a private party's
speech to prevent First Amendment scrutiny is constitutionally
243.
244.
245.
246.

Turner, 534 F.3d at 356.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999).
Johanns,544 U.S. at 577-78 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 579.
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mendacious. Indeed, it is entirely at odds with the substance and
purposes of the First Amendment. An indiscriminate government
speech doctrine based on legal fictions must be evaluated with
great care and scrutiny under principled standards.
V. "OUR CiVIc FAITI'-JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL
RELIGION?

A.

"Government Speech" and Freedom of Religious Expression

The impact of the government speech doctrine has
implications for both the Religion Clauses and religious Free
Speech. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter have warned of
one reading of the doctrine that could impact Establishment
Clause decisions: "the government could well argue, as a
development of government speech doctrine, that when it
expresses its own views, it is free of the Establishment Clause's
stricture against discriminating among religious sects or
groups." 247 On the other hand, the doctrine likewise poses a threat
to free speech interests by providing a new justification for stifling
individual religious expression on public property or at public
events. For example, in Hinrichs v. Bosma,248 the District Court in
a legislative prayer case involving the Indiana House of
Representatives advanced the government speech doctrine to find
that "the House prayers are government speech. . . given with the
Speaker's permission, whether he chooses to monitor the content
or not. They reflect government speech, not private speech, a
fundamental distinction in First Amendment law."24 9 The Hinrichs
Court relied upon a Fourth Circuit holding that legislative
prayer-even though individually promulgated and spoken by
individual speakers-is categorically government speech, a
holding that provides government extraordinary latitude in
infringing individual free speech and viewpoints.250 Cases
involving censorship of other kinds of speeches at governmental
events may also easily be collapsed into a broad and
indiscriminate rubric of "government speech," summarily
removing protections under the Free Speech Clause.
247. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring).
248. Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1105 (S.D. Ind. 2005), rev'd, 440 F.3d 393
(7th Cir. 2006).
249. Id. at 1129. Notably, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit studiously avoided
collapsing the analysis of government speech under the Free Speech and
Establishment Clauses, summarily disposing of the "government speech"
argument in its last footnote by dismissing the Free Speech claim on grounds
that "individuals have sharply restrained speech and free exercise rights when
speaking on behalf of the government, rather than for themselves alone." Id.
at 402 n.5.
250. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 288 (4th Cir. 2005); cf. Turner, 534 F.3d at 353.
(4th Cir. 2008).
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In the Fourth Circuit legislative prayer case, Simpson v.
Chesterfield County Board. of Supervisors,25 1 Simpson, a Wiccan
priestess, brought an action challenging the constitutionality of
the County Board's policy restricting potential prayer-givers to
representatives of Judeo-Christian or monotheistic religions. She
had been excluded from a list of local religious leaders available to
provide non-sectarian invocations prior to public sessions of the
county board of supervisors. 252 Holding in favor of the Board,
however, the Fourth Circuit upheld the county's selection of, and
instructions to, participating clergy as permissible legislative
prayer under the rubric set out in Marsh v. Chambers,253 which
does not inquire into the content of legislative prayer unless the
"prayer opportunity" has been abused. 254
Although the case was decided under Marsh, the court was
forced to resolve Simpson's allegation that the persons selected by
the County to pray resulted in a denominational preference, and
thereby discriminated and denied equal protection of the law. 255
With very little analysis, and without using the framework of the

251. Simpson, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005).
252. Simpson argued that the County's policy violated equal protection
principles set forth "in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (finding
"denominational preference" to violate the Establishment Clause), as well as
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (creating a general framework to evaluate
Establishment Clause challenges)." Id. at 280.
253. The Fourth Circuit found the county board's policy of selecting clergy
was permissible where "the selection of the minister from one denomination,
to the exclusion of other clerics . . . [did not matter so long as the selection did
not] stem from an impermissible motive." Simpson, 404 F.3d at 285. The court
found the county's policy exceeded the Marsh standards where, "fiun contrast
to Marsh's single Presbyterian clergyman, the County welcomes rabbis,
imams, priests, pastors, and ministers. Chesterfield not only sought but
achieved diversity. The first-come, first-serve system led to prayers being
given by a wide cross-section of the County's religious leaders." Id. As to the
county's instructions to the clergy regarding the content of the invocations, the
court found that "Chesterfield has aspired to non-sectarianism and requested
that invocations refrain from using Christ's name or, for that matter, any
denominational appeal." Id. at 284. The court found that the invocation "is a
blessing. . . for the benefit of the board, rather than for the individual leading
the invocation or for those who might also be present. In other words,
Chesterfield's invocations are directed only at the legislators themselves." Id.
254. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95. The Marsh Court stated that:
[t]he content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here,
there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.
That being so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to
parse the content of a particular prayer.
Id.; see also, Luther III & Caddell, supra note 18 (stating that "[c]ourts should
continue to focus on the 'prayer opportunity' and not the 'content of the prayer'
when analyzing legislative prayer cases.").
255. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 280.
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Fourth Circuit's four-factor test for government speech, 256 the
panel stated that despite the fact that religious leaders in their
individual capacities created the content of invocations, the
invocations were government speech, 257 indeed, a constructive
government-prescribed prayer. Quoting the magistrate's finding,
the panel found that the "avowed purpose of the invocation is
simply that of a brief pronouncement of simple values presumably
intended to solemnize the occasion" and that it was not "intended
for the exchange of views or other public discourse . . . or the

exercise of one's religion." 258 Since "to a degree" the content of the
invocation was governed by the Board's established guidelines, the
Board regulated the content of what is or is not expressed when it
enlisted private entities to convey its own message and was,
therefore, government speech.259 Despite the fact that the County
invited a diverse group of clergy to give their own individually
expressed invocations, 260 the Simpson majority went further,
however, to endorse civic religion as the only permitted and
legitimate expression of legislative prayer:
We cannot adopt a view of the tradition of legislative prayer that
chops up American citizens on public occasions into representatives
of one sect and one sect only, whether Christian, Jewish, or Wiccan.
In private observances, the faithful surely choose to express the
unique aspects of their creeds. But in their civic faith, Americans
have reached more broadly. Our civic faith seeks guidance that is not
the property of any sect. To ban all manifestationsof this faith would
needlessly transform and devitalize the very nature of our culture.
When we gather as Americans, we do not abandon all expressions of
religious faith. Instead, our expressions evoke common and inclusive
themes and forswear, as Chesterfield has done, the forbidding
characterof sectarian invocations.261
The majority's uncharacteristically summary finding that
legislative prayer is government speech was apparently motivated
by a desire to paper over the dramatically different views of the
256. In Planned Parenthood , the Fourth Circuit applied a four factor test to
determine whether the speech at issue was government or private. This test
considers,
(1) the central purpose of the program in which the speech in question
occurs; (2) the degree of editorial control exercised by the government or
private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the
literal speaker; and (4) whether the government or the private entity
bears the ultimate responsibility for the content of the speech.
Id. at 792-93.
257. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 288.

258. Id. at 287 (emphasis added).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 279 ("Instead of choosing a single chaplain to provide the
invocations, the Board invites religious leaders from congregations within
Chesterfield County.").
261. Id. at 287 (emphasis added).
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judges of the Circuit on government speech. 262 Taking a cue from
the court's finding that the invocation is only "a blessing . . . for
the benefit of the board,"263 Judge Niemeyer's separate

concurrence made explicit that the scrutiny given to "the
government's own speech" and to "the government's own prayer" is
different under the First Amendment and "more relaxed than the
analysis for scrutinizing government prohibitions or impositions of
speech on the people . . . [and] government prescriptions or
proscriptions of prayer for the people."264 Drawing from the
Preamble of the United States Constitution, no less, Judge
Niemeyer argued that the structure of the Constitution and its
emphasis on "We the People" is aimed at preserving the people's
liberty, but that "when members of a governmental body
participate in a prayer for themselves and do not impose it on or
prescribe it for the people, the religious liberties secured to the
people by the FirstAmendment are not directly implicated, and the
265
distinct, more tolerant analysis articulated in Marsh governs."
Thus, the distinction drawn by Judge Niemeyer lies between
"nondenominational prayers for the purpose and benefit of [a
266
legislative] body" and "prescribed prayer for the people."
A subsequent Fourth Circuit legislative prayer case, Turner v.
Mayor and City CouncilofFredericksburg,267 also raised significant
government speech issues in the context of legislative prayer. In
that case, the Reverend Hashmel Turner, an elected member of

262. See supra note 29; see also Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 370 (holding that
"Choose Life," as it is to appear on the face of Tennessee specialty license
plates, is a government-crafted message because Tennessee "sets the overall
message to be communicated and approves every word that is disseminated"
on the "Choose Life" plate); Arizona Life Coalition, Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d
956 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that Arizona's failure to approve a "Choose Life"
special license plate violated the Coalition's Free Speech rights); Women's
Emergency Network, 323 F.3d at 937 (finding government attachment to
message on Florida specialty license plates insufficient to hold that messages
represent government speech).
263. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 284.
264. Id. at 288 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
265. Id. at 289 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
266. Id. (first emphasis added). Earlier, in Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355
(4th Cir. 2003), the Fourth Circuit ruled that a prescribed dinner prayer for
cadets at the Virginia Military Institute violated the Establishment Clause
and in Wynne, 376 F.3d at 292, that legislative prayer at the Great Falls,
South Carolina, Town Council meetings was proselytizing in nature, and
therefore, exceeded prayer that was otherwise permitted by Marsh, 463 U.S.
at 783. In a subsequent Fourth Circuit case, Turner, 534 F.3d at 352, the
Mayor and Council argued that dicta in the Wynne decision prohibited
legislative prayer containing mention of Jesus Christ, thereby justifying a City
policy requiring legislators to give only nondenominational prayers. Turner,
534 F.3d at 352.
267. Turner v. Mayor and City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352 (4th
Cir. 2008).
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the City Council of Fredericksburg, Virginia, participated with
other City Council members in a decades-old rotation of offering
prayer before each City Council meeting. Turner typically closed
his prayers "in the name of Jesus Christ."268 After the Fourth
Circuit decided yet another legislative prayer case, Wynne v. Town
of Great Falls,269 the American Civil Liberties Union demanded
that Reverend Turner cease use of the name of Jesus Christ in his
prayers, contending that legislative prayer could not contain
sectarian references without violating the Establishment
Clause. 270 Under this pressure, the City Council adopted a policy
by a three to one vote (with Reverend Turner abstaining) requiring
that all prayers be "nondenominational." 271 When Turner
requested to rejoin the prayer rotation, and indicated he could not
as a matter of conscience cease closing his prayers in the name of
Jesus, the Mayor refused to call on him to pray, even though other
council members were permitted under the policy to pray to
"Almighty God," "Father," and "Heavenly Father." 272 Turner
sought to declare the policy unconstitutional on grounds that the
Council's policy discriminated against his right to free speech
based on viewpoint and constituted an Establishment of Religion
in that the Council was prescribing the content of individual
Council members' prayers. 273
The District Court found that the "central purpose of the
program in which the speech occurs" 274 was the conduct of City
Council business, with the prayer listed on the official agenda for
each meeting. For Establishment Clause reasons, it found that
"the local government can (and must, to comply with the
Establishment Clause) exercise editorial control over the speech's

268. Id. at 354.
269. In Wynne, the Fourth Circuit enjoined the Town Council of Great Falls,
South Carolina, from offering prayers before each council meeting that
specifically invoked the name of Jesus Christ. After a trial, the District Court
concluded that the Town Council had insisted upon invoking the name "Jesus
Christ" to the exclusion of deities associated with any other particular
religious faith at Town Council meetings, preferring Christianity over other
religions and thus violating the Establishment Clause. "Government speech"
was not used as a justification for the decision in the Wynne case. Wynne, 376
F.3d at 294.
270. Turner ceased offering prayer on the rotation while the City Attorney
studied the matter. After months of study, the City Attorney opined that the
City Council could "continue its current practice of offering the official prayer
to a non-denominational 'God,' without invoking the name of a specifically
Christian (or other denominational) deity." Turner v. City Council of
Fredericksburg, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 56786, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2006).
271. Id.
272. Id. at *3.
273. Id. at *14.
274. Id. at *8.
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content."275 It identified Councilor Turner as the speaker, "a
government official, acting in his official capacity." 276 It also
determined that "the ultimate responsibility for the content of the
speech, rested upon the City Council on whose behalf the prayer is
offered" and "[tihe prayer may not be offered without the Mayor's
permission."277 Then, relying on Simpson, the court ruled that
Councilor Turner's prayer was government speech, with no
protection under the First Amendment. 278
The Fourth Circuit affirmed in an opinion written by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor. 279 Notwithstanding the fact that there was
no allegation or finding in the record that Turner was attempting
to proselytize in his prayers, as seemed to be required for
intervention under Marsh, Justice O'Connor rejected the claims of
viewpoint discrimination and free speech infringement, holding
that the legislative prayer is government speech and that
governments are free to determine the means and method by
which legislative prayer is offered, whether or not individual
speech interests are implicated:
In Marsh, the legislature employed a single chaplain and printed
the prayers he offered in prayerbooks at public expense. By contrast,
the legislature in Simpson allowed a diverse group of church leaders
from around the community to give prayers at open meetings. Both
varieties of legislative prayer were found constitutional. The prayers
in both cases shared a common characteristic: they recognized the
rich religious heritage of our country in a fashion that was designed
280
to include members of the community, ratherthan to proselytize.

Justice O'Connor rejected Turner's assertion that the
Council's policy requiring non-denominational prayer violated
constitutional proscriptions against governmentally-prescribed
282
prayer announced in Engel v. Vitale,281 and Lee v. Weisman. Her
answer: "The Supreme Court of the United States has treated
283
legislative prayer differently from prayer at school events."
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Turner's argument that the City's "nondenominational" policy violated

the Establishment Clause by prescribing the content of prayers was rejected
because under Simpson, Councilor Turner's prayer is government speech,
without protection under First and Fourteenth Amendments. Turner, 534 F.3d
at 353.

279. Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
280. Id. at 356.
281. Engel, 370 U.S. at 425.
282. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
283. Turner, 534 F.3d at 356. See also Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1087 (holding there
was no constitutional violation when defendsant school prevented student
from playing instrumental version of "Ave Maria" at her public high school's
commencement ceremony); McComb, 320 Fed. Appx. at 507 (holding that
defendants did not violate Free Speech and Free Exercise rights by preventing
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Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Simpson and Turner
rulings was that the underlying rationale was tantamount to a
judicial establishment of American Civil Religion. The Simpson
panel declared:
[o]ur civic faith seeks guidance that is not the property of any sect .
When we gather as Americans, we do not abandon all
expressions of religious faith. Instead, our expressions evoke
common and inclusive themes and forswear, as Chesterfield has
done, the forbidding character of sectarian invocations;2 84
. . .

and the Turner panel likewise opined,
the rich religious heritage of our country . . . [is] designed to include

members of the community, rather than to proselytize. 285
The holdings stand for the proposition that individually
expressed prayer or other speech with sectarian components can
be outlawed, while individually expressed "nondenominational"
prayer or speech can be expressed with impunity, notwithstanding
that the latter may not be truly non-denominational in content.
Moreover, the underlying creed is a "civic faith" that lawfully
permits government to exclude expression of other creeds. The
Fourth Circuit panels in Simpson and Turner have thus not only
approved extraordinarily broad legislative discretion banning
individual speech when there was no finding of proselytizationarguably favoring religious messages from some speakers based on
content to the exclusion of other religious messages-they have in
the process declared the establishment of a "civic faith," a faith
that government is "free" to establish with constitutional impunity
because it has been determined to be government speech.
Speakers who agree with it and tailor their speech to fit the
prescribed "civic faith" are free to speak; those who do not may be
lawfully silenced and censored, even though their speech may not
proselytize.
B. "Government Speech" under the Establishment and Free
Speech Clauses.
The indiscriminate definition of government speech in the
Summum case and the summary definitions of government speech
in the Simpson and Turner cases in the Fourth Circuit, do not
adequately serve the interests of protecting precious constitutional
liberties. Perhaps most troubling about Justice Alito's rationale in
Summum is the failure of the Court's majority to require
student from making a proselytizing graduation speech); Borden v. Sch. Dist.
of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that the
Establishment Clause would be violated if the school allowed the football
coach to engage in prayer with his team while on one knee with heads bowed).
284. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 287.
285. Turner, 534 F.3d at 356.
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government to identify the message it seeks to advance. Instead,
monument speech became government speech simply because the
City "'effectively controlled' the messages sent by the monuments
in the Park by exercising 'final approval authority' over their
selection." 286 Moreover, "[e]ven when a monument features the
written word, the monument may be intended to be interpreted,
and may in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety
of ways." 287 It is possible, Justice Alito explained, that "the
thoughts or sentiments expressed by a government entity that
accepts and displays such an object may be quite different from
those of either its creator or its donor." 288 Moreover, the message
may change over time, or be altered by the addition of other
monuments. Thus, if government displays virtually any otherwise
reasonable non-prohibited message, it is ipso facto government
speech and thus exempt from constitutional restriction.
The implications for the legions of non-monument
government speech are virtually unlimited. Free speech implies
minimal governmental intervention in the individual propagation
of ideas. But the boundaries that government imposes to restrict
the use of public places and property, and the means to propagate
ideas, may greatly inhibit a speaker and his or her message.
Government monopolization of speech or of a forum empowers
officials to silence individual expression completely. A potential
consequence of the Court's choice to rest its government speech
rationale on "government control" of premises or events is thus
that privately promulgated religious speech spoken at government
controlled events may be readily censored in almost all
circumstances. It is one thing for government to advance a
message openly and notoriously, thereby allowing it to be
challenged and revoked through the political process-even
messages with elements of Civil Religion like the Pledge of
Allegiance, or "In God We Trust"289-but it is quite another for
286. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134. The Court's apparently expanding view
on how government control and supervision trumps Free Speech interests is
seen in yet another recent Free Speech case in which a student released from
school and standing on a public sidewalk holding a sign "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" at
an Olympic torch parade was disciplined even though he was not on school
property or under the control of school officials. See Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. 393, 403 (2007).
287. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135.
288. Id. at 1136.
289. The same is true when the context of government sponsorship of
symbolic speech contains religious elements. See id. at 1125 (holding that a
Ten Commandments monument in a city park among diverse structural and
other community displays is a form of government speech and not subject to
scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677 (holding
that a Ten Commandments monument among numerous other monuments on
Texas State Capital grounds does not violate Establishment Clause); Lynch,
465 U.S. at 668 (holding that Nativity scene in city Christmas display with
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privately promulgated messages to be deemed to be government
speech simply because they occur at governmentally sponsored
events or on government property. The latter, of course, results in
the exemption of officials from the strictures of constitutional
scrutiny and allows censorship of disfavored messages and the
advancement of "preferred" messages, including "preferred"
religious messages that are truly private in origin.
It appears that Justice Alito may not subscribe to the
ultimate extension of the Summum rationale. In Nurre v.
Whitehead,290 a recent case involving school censorship of a
student instrumental performance of "Ave Maria" at a high school
graduation ceremony, the Court denied certiorari, 291 but Justice
Alito dissented, finding that the Ninth Circuit's decision in the
case "authorizes school administrators to ban any controversial
student expression at any school event attended by parents and
others who feel obligated to be present because of the importance
of the event for the participating students."292 Although the case
did not expressly involve specific assertions of government speech,
it did so implicitly. Justice Alito advocated plenary review because
of the case's "potentially broad and troubling implications," 293
specifically commenting:
When a public school administration speaks for itself and takes
public responsibility for its speech, it may say what it wishes
without violating the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech. But when a public school purports to allow students to
express themselves, it must respect the students' free speech rights.
School administrators may not behave like puppet masters who
create the illusion that students are engaging in personal expression
when in fact the school administration is pulling the strings. 294
In a world where speech in government settings is deemed to
be government speech because government controls the event, and
otherwise is deemed to be private only if government specifically
invites all comers to participate without restriction, the
opportunity for government censorship is virtually unrestricted.
The harm is more egregious where government permits a private
speaker to deliver a religious message that comports with civil
religion but censors another speaker at the same event because
her religious message is deemed to depart from civil religion or to
be sectarian, or proselytizing. 295
diverse symbolic elements does not have effect of endorsing Christianity and
does not violate Establishment Clause).
290. 130 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (Alito, J., dissenting).
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1939 (citation omitted).
This is illustrated in cases where some private religious speech was
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Professors Amar and Brownstein have pointed out that the
rush to exclude the Summum monument may fail to account for
unintended consequences, such as the brick memorials,
courtyards, and walkways on public school grounds, where parents
and students are invited to display individualized message. 296
Justice Alito seems to dismiss such concerns: "if a town created a
monument on which all of its residents (or all those meeting some
other criterion) could place the name of a person to be honored or
some other private message," forum principles might apply. 297 But
the devil is in the details. Without strict scrutiny, the "government
control" rationale transmogrifies speech every time into
government speech. Already messages with religious content,
whether it be a cross on a brick next to the name of a Columbine
High School victim, or a scripture verse, or even the Ten
Commandments among seventeen other bricks containing secular
messages or displays, would very likely be government speech if
government restricted the categories of messages that could be
displayed. 298 On the Establishment Clause side, by characterizing
all monuments as government speech, it may be difficult, if not
impossible, to justify permitting the display of any private or
public symbols, monuments andlor memorials or government
censored and other private religious speech was permitted to be advanced or
where religious speech was deemed to be too controversial or beyond Civil
Religion. See, e.g., Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1087 (holding that there was no
constitutional violation when defendant school prevented student from playing
"Ave Maria" at her public high school's commencement ceremony but allowed
eight other instrumental musical selections, one of which had religious lyrics);
McComb, 320 Fed. Appx. at 507 (holding that the school did not violate Free
Speech and Free Exercise rights by preventing student from making an
allegedly proselytizing graduation speech while permitting another religionbased speech); Turner, 534 F.3d at 353 (holding that city's policy requiring
legislative prayers to be nondenominational did not violate Free Speech and
Free Exercise rights when other prayers mentioned deities); Simpson, 404
F.3d at 278 (affirming grant of summary judgment to legislative board
approving prayer that did not allow prayer leaders to use name "Jesus Christ"
and required leaders to avoid denominational appeal).
296. Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Does a Minority Religion Have a
Right to Join Majority Religions in Placing Its Own Monument in a Public
Park?, FINDLAW (Apr. 25, 2008), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20080425.

html.
297. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138.
298. Compare Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist., 398 F.3d 918 (10th Cir.
2002) (holding that tile with message "4/22/99 Jesus Wept" can be excluded
from Columbine High School memorial because it was school supervised, done
with school approved funding, and displayed permanently on school grounds);
with Demmon v. Loudon Cnty. Pub. Sch., 342 F. Supp. 2d 474 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(holding that school engaged in impermissible viewpoint expression with a
religious viewpoint when school removed bricks inscribed with the Latin cross
purchased by parents and relatives of school students and graduates from the
school's "walkway of fame" located on school property as limited public forum
had been created by the school).

922

The John MarshallLaw Review

[43:869

property that contain a religious message, except in the midst of
multiple other monuments. Indeed, in the extreme, each grave
marker on individual grave containing a religious symbol at
Arlington National Cemetery might conceivably be deemed to
advance a "government message."
As previously noted, the disturbing and emerging exclusion of
private speech with sectarian religious content at publicly
sponsored events and on public property as government speech or
"government-sponsored" speech carries with it a monopolistic
framework in which all branches and levels of government, root,
stem, and branch, are empowered-by the federal judiciary and
ultimately the Supreme Court-to censor private messages. When
it involves religion, it allows judgments to be made between and
among private persons as to the content of the religious message
being advanced. Here, the bar to "denominational" or "sectarian"
speech casts individual religious adherents outside the gate of
participation in significant public events in civil society, leaving
only the expression of the doctrines of American Civil Religion,
and similar secular philosophies, theories and opinions,
unimpeded to reign supreme in the public square. This
exclusionary orthodoxy, now being advanced in a variety of cases
throughout the country, portends grave consequences for freedom
of inquiry and social equality, let alone the ultimate distortion of
civil discourse.
Generalized governmental religious platitudes, overbearing
government-speak, and judicially-created legal fictions threaten to
stifle the marketplace, and diversity, of individually expressed

religious ideas and opinions and how they may apply to national
issues or problems. Would, for example, Martin Luther King, Jr.
be permitted to speak at a governmental event of the peaceful civil
disobedience of Jesus Christ without censorship of this sectarian
reference? Or would he instead be constrained, as the Federal
District Court required in the Indiana legislative prayer case, to
invoke "a divine appeal [that was] wide-ranging, tying its
legitimacy to common religious ground." 299 With the federal courts
now installed as the final arbiters of all things religious, reaching
even into the legislative branch,300 the Speaker of the Indiana
House of Representatives was enjoined by the Federal District
Court to
advise persons offering such a prayer (a) that it must be nonsectarian and must not be used to proselytize or advance any one
299. Hinrichs,400 F. Supp. 2d at 1127.
300. See generally James J. Knicely, 'Tirst Principles" and The
Misplacement of the 'Wall of Separation," Too Late in the Day for a Cure?, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 171 (2004) (noting that Everson federalized relationship
between religion and states and allowed Court to override state-prescribed
religiouspractices).
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faith or belief or to disparage any other faith or belief, and (b) that
they should refrain from using Christ's name or title or any other
denominational appeal. 301
This reasoning is based on the fiction that an individual
offering a prayer at a public event is speaking a message for the
government, when in fact the reasonable observer (at least the
omniscient reasonable observer) would recognize the prayer as
that of the individual who spoke it.302
By excluding individually expressed religious viewpoints from
public events, the only freedom for persons of religious
conscience-be they Wiccan, Christian, Jew, Muslim, or
Nativist,-is to bow to government orthodoxy and compromise
conscience in giving individually promulgated prayers, or to accept
exclusion from the exercise of liberties granted to other citizens.
The vehicle for this incursion is not really the government's
ostensibly unlimited and unchecked power to define the message it
wishes to advance on its own property, but a jurisprudential
fiction that attributes government sponsorship and endorsement
to views that are decidedly not promulgated by government at
all. 303
Thus, an indiscriminate and broadly fashioned view of what
is, and is not, government speech permits individual religious
expression at public events on government property to be freely
censored (regardless of the content of the speech of other speakers

301. Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
302. See, e.g., Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 (stating that "there is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which
the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect." (emphasis added)); Nurre,
130 S. Ct. at 1939 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that "when a public school
purports to allow students to express themselves, it must respect the students'
free speech rights. School administrators may not behave like puppet masters
who create the illusion that students are engaging in personal expression
when in fact the school administration is pulling the strings."); Doe ex rel. Doe
v. Sch. Dist. of Norfolk, 340 F.3d 605, 613 (8th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that "[a]n
objective Norfolk Senior High student would undoubtedly perceive Scheer's
comments [prayer at graduation] as his own private remarks."); Adler v. Duval
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (announcing that [this
Court has] "rejected the argument that the state's role in providing a vehicle
for a graduation message by itself transformed the student's private speech
into state-sponsored speech."); id. at 1341 (stating that "[w]hat turns private
speech into state speech in this context is, above all, the additional element of
state control over the content of the message." (citation omitted)).
303. Cf. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375 (1985), rev'd,
521 U.S. 203 (1997) (finding "symbolic union" of church and state when school
district provided remedial education classes to parochial school students at
public expense), overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223-228
(1997) (rejecting Grand Rapids presumption of "symbolic union" between
church and state for state remedial education program conducted on parochial
school premises).
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in the same forum). The Court's broad rationale in Summum
permits government speech in nearly every instance to trump
individual religious expression and to remove most individually
expressed religious speech at government sponsored events from
the public square. It threatens individual rights of religious
adherents; it promotes the tyranny of majoritarianism; it forsakes
principles of accommodation and tolerance; and it bears the
tendency of absolute power to corrupt-inexorably prescribing a
wall of religious orthodoxy based on the lowest common
denominator of faith-a stultifying state religion dead to the
uniquely American social dynamic of rich, healthy, tolerant, and
vitally alive expression. 304 As the Supreme Court declared in Lee v.
Weisman, 305

If common ground can be defined which permits once conflicting
faiths to express the shared conviction that there is an ethic and a
morality which transcend human invention, the sense of community
and purpose sought by all decent societies might be advanced. But
though the First Amendment does not allow the government to stifle
prayers which aspire to these ends, neither does it permit the
government to undertake that task for itself.

[P]recedents caution us to measure the idea of a civic religion
against the central meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, which is that all creeds must be tolerated and none
favored. The suggestion that government may establish an official or
civic religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of a religion
with more specific creeds strikes us as a contradictionthat cannot be
accepted.306

James Madison noted that one of the merits of limited
governmental involvement with religion was a religious message
that was free to flourish. 307 This legitimate rationale against an
against
application
has
legitimate
Established Church
establishment of governmental orthodoxy that, in effect, promotes
304. Alexis De Tocqueville worried in his 1831 survey of emerging America
that its democratic institutions would compel members of the community "to
live alike," in private as well as public life. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, VOLUME II 215 (Knopf 1956) (1851). He came to

reject this hypothesis, however, recognizing that "no state of society or laws
can render men so much alike, [because) education, fortune, and tastes will
always interpose some differences between them." Id. Despite concern over
democracy's proclivity to social uniformity, De Tocqueville observed that
Americans "will set up, close by the great political community, small private
societies, united together by similitude of conditions, habits, and customs." Id.
305. Lee, 505 U.S. at 589-90.
306. Id. (emphasis added).
307. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, June 20, 1785, http://www.law.gmu.edulassets/files/academics/fo
unders/madison'smemorial.pdf.
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American Civil Religion. Thus, by proscribing prayers in
government meetings that mention the name of "Jesus Christ,"
while permitting the mention of other names for God (as well as
prayer advancing discernible characteristics of certain religions),
government discriminates against selected religious adherents,
opening the forum to speakers who espouse a governmentally
favored philosophical or religious message, but closing it for those
who do not.
In contrast to the Bill of Rights' preference for free exercise of
religion, the court system's declaration of a "civic faith" grants
preferred free exercise status to adherents of tenets of American
Civil Religion, as well as secular philosophies and theories that
compete for the spiritual allegiance of the citizenry. Society is left
with platitudinal judicial endorsements of legislative prayer and
"ceremonial deism" 308 and is instructed that these serve to
solemnize public events, in token recognition of supposed general
ties that bind the community together, where no persons (except
perhaps adherents) are made to feel excluded. In reality, this
patronizing judicial makeover of religious expression discriminates
based on viewpoint and denies a societal outlet for expression to
all but those who serve the state religion. 309 Moreover, it
diminishes the wit of the American people who, in the judiciary's
view, are apparently either too naive or unsophisticated to
distinguish between private speech and government sponsorship,
or to know that government does not endorse everything it permits
to be spoken on public property. 310
But there is an even darker side to this judicial makeover.
The judiciary's approbation of the American Civil Religion in a
time of religious and cultural diversity not only emasculates the
expression of diverse values but grants to government
indiscriminate tentacles of monopoly and its proclivity to the
308. See Robert Luther III, Unity Through Division: Religious Liberty and
the Virtue of Pluralism in the Context of Legislative Prayer Controversies, 43
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 33 (2009) (concluding article "by rejecting the
'ceremonial deism' model of legislative prayer advanced by Justice O'Connor
(and others) and proposing a 'unity through division' model that would permit
speakers to pray according to their consciences and forbid government from
excluding speakers on the basis of their theologies.") (citing Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 37 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
309. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (recognizing that the Constitution
"affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions,
and forbids hostility towards any" (citations omitted)); Luther, supra note 308,
at 22 (writing that "the idea that government can exclude speakers of
particular faiths or prefer faiths of 'Judeo-Christian traditions' is antithetical
to ecumenism and certainly does not comport with the United States Supreme
Court's recent 'neutrality' framework.").
310. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 696 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that
"[tielling either nonbelievers or believers that the words "under God" have no
meaning contradicts what they know to be true.").
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intolerance, oppression, and totalitarianism inherent in a
"religious" establishment.3 1' American Civil Religion contains a
potentially explosive mix of God and country that reaches to every
street and lane in the land and poses a far greater threat to civil
liberties, and indeed to the country, than any individually
expressed "denominational" speech or prayer. The latter, in its
own simple way, contains the means not only to defuse and
confront potentially destructive governmentally-approved and
monopolistic religious rituals that intermingle with genuine
patriotism, but to contribute to the diverse, disparate, and
vigorous expression that has been characteristic of American
democracy.312

The choice is otherwise a censorship that narrows the
spectrum of free speech and undermines not only the social
dynamic, but by the walls it erects, establishes the intolerant
orthodoxy it ostensibly seeks to prevent. Thus, the emerging
argument that individual religious expression containing
"denominational" references spoken at public events is
unprotected because it is government speech-and that
government can at the same time permit and encourage
expression at such events of a deity and sacred elements
associated with American Civil Religion-should be viewed with
great caution and careful scrutiny.

311. Already, scholars are suggesting adherence to the established civil
religion has a disproportionate impact on election results. Ronald Wimberley,
a professor of sociology at North Carolina State University, recently suggested
that he can predict who will win the Presidency based on a 1984 general
election survey showing "voters are four times as likely to prefer a presidential
candidate who they perceive to uphold the values of America's civil religionregardless of whether those voters are religious themselves." John Green,
senior fellow in religion and American politics at the Pew Forum on Religion &
Public Life in Washington, D.C. agrees that "[a]t some minimal level a
candidate has to associate with these ideas or they'll have a difficult time
winning." In the 1984 survey, "voters were four times as likely to prefer
Reagan over Mondale precisely because they perceived Reagan as holding a
stronger version of the nation's civil religion." Yonat Shimron, Our civil
religion, THE NEWS & OBSERVER, May 2, 2008, http://www.Newsobserver.com/
2008/05/02/43152/ou-civilreligion.html#storyline=misearch.
312. It has been suggested that the real teaching of Marsh is that courts in
their consideration of challenges to legislative prayer should focus initially on
the "legislative practices and motivations behind the prayer opportunity" and
only move to parse the content of particular prayers in the face of explicit and
intentional proselytization. See Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d
188, 211 (5th. Cir. 2006) (Clement, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(noting the majority's misreading of Marsh regarding school board's practice of
opening its meetings with sectarian Christian prayer); see also Luther and
Caddell, supra note 18, at 573 (noting that where lower federal courts have
failed to adopt consistent framework for determining Constitutional legislative
prayer, a return to Marsh sets an appropriate balance between permissible
legislative prayer and proselytizing).

2010]

In God We Trust

927

VI. CONCLUSION
Woodrow Wilson once declared that "[t]he history of liberty is
a history of limitations of government power, not the increase of
it.313 The judicial declaration of a "civic faith" threatens liberty at
several levels. The broad and indiscriminate definition of
"government speech" provides no check on government's power to
restrict privately promulgated speech at publicly sponsored
events, but rather facilitates censorship. It also discourages
accommodation, tolerance, and appreciation of the country's
pluralism-qualities that have made America great. And it
discriminates against those Americans who want to express their
worldview and beliefs, but unlike other Americans who have
liberty for such expression, are forbidden to speak because of

alleged sectarian content.
Madison warned of the danger of a monopoly on religious and
other speech in Federalist No. 10, where he said: "the variety of
sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national
councils against any danger from that source." Put another way,
"[m]adness is diluted in larger seas."31 4 Limiting expressions of
legislative prayer and religious views at public events and in

public programs to a seemingly grand, judicially declared "civic
faith"-mandating "inclusion" and "evoking common and inclusive
themes" and "forswearing the forbidding character of sectarian
invocations"-removes the solvent of diverse speech from this
discourse and may contribute to civic madness. As Professor Stout
concludes:
For the Civil War to achieve its messianic destiny and inculcate an
ongoing civil religion, it required a blood sacrifice that appeared
total .... Americans in the North and the South came to believe
that their bloodletting contained a profound religious meaning for
their collective life as nations . .. . By condoning the logic

of

total

war in the name of abolition-and victory-Americans effectively
guaranteed that other atrocities in other wars could likewise be
15
excused in the name of "military necessity.3
Similar concerns were recognized more contemporaneously by
writer E.J. Dionne and Theologian Richard John Neuhaus in the

313. Woodrow Wilson, Address to New York Press Club, Sept. 9, 1912, in
FRANK R. STRONG, JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION OF
GOVERNMENTAL POWER 3 (1997).
314. GARRETT WARD SHELDON, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES
MADISON 62 (2001).

315. STOUT, supra note 2, at 459-60. As examples of "other atrocities," Stout
refers to actions taken against Native Americans in the West, quoting among
others, General William Tecumseh Sherman's response to the Fetterman
massacre in December 21, 1866: "We must act with vindictive earnestness
against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women and children." Id.
at 460 (citation omitted).
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wake of September 11, 2001, when patriotic sentiments
understandably reached great heights in the wake of the attacks
on New York City and the Pentagon. Dionne commented:
A turn to civil religion can be noble because it calls society to higher
standards, but forging too close a bond between religion and our own
society's immediate needs and political interests can also be
316
dangerous, particularly for religious faith itself.
Neuhaus likewise observed:
[There] is always a very real danger, that the conflation of biblical
religion and patriotism and the national sense of crisis and the need
for a commanding set of truths that will congeal the allegiance of
people in pursuit of a purpose that is attended by a high cost, there
will always be a temptation to turn civil piety or the commanding
truths of the public square into a sort of religion, and that, it seems
to me, is something that we need to resist even while we recognize
that American society, like any society, does have a need for
commanding truths in public. 317
No less should the judiciary be aware of the dangers of
establishing a monopoly on the propagation of religious speech
based on a misguided interpretation of what is, and is not,
government speech at public events. As Professor Stout observes,
American Civil Religion "is religious and ideological, cultural and
theological. For that reason, it exerts enormous power on the
loyalties and perceptions of its citizens: a power that can be even
greater than traditional theistic beliefs and rituals."3iS
Without a nuanced and discriminate approach, judiciallyapproved governmental action to prohibit individually expressed
religious sentiments at public events will leave American Civil
Religion by default as the established national religion that the
First Amendment prohibits. Sealing out non-conforming religious
expression allows for too dangerous a concentration of civil religion
close to the fires of politics or nationalism, threatening the
blessings of liberty. Lost in this mix is the wisdom of Madison who,
instead of advocating civil religion as the salvation of the Republic,
argued that diversity of viewpoints was the source of its
protection.3 19 The cleansing of individual religious expression
under the fiction that it is government speech, or because it is
perceived as failing to advance "our civic faith,"320 is an ill-advised
jurisprudence threatening not only principles set forth in the Bill

316. Colloquy, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, God Bless America:
Reflections on Civil Religion After September 11 (Feb. 6, 2002), available at
http://pewforum.org/events/index.php?EventlD=22 (last visited Jan. 2, 2011).
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id.
SToUT, supra note 2, at xx.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 26.
Simpson, 404 F.3d at 287.
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